What Is Happening in Afghanistan?
I’m back with another conversation with my colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman. This time we’re discussing America’s departure from Afghanistan and the alarming events that have since followed. It’s a chaotic, complicated situation. Below Dr. Sulaiman and I try to make sense of what has happened and what might happen going forward.
Brad Nelson: Let’s start with a basic question. What do you make of what’s happening in Afghanistan? Anything stand out?
Yohanes Sulaiman: The Afghan Army immediately collapsed even though the U.S. has spent zillions of dollars in 20 years to train and arm it. That basically shows the terrible quality of its leadership and deep and ingrained corruption in its government. Yes, lots of ethnic groups/tribal loyalty going on. But that doesn't explain much. Other countries have their tribal loyalties/network going on, and they still manage to create a cohesive armed forces. So the only explanation left is the terrible quality of Afghanistan's corrupt leadership and America’s military/diplomats that turned blind eyes on the mess, thinking that they would make situation worse by interfering. Don't forget the usual interference from Pakistan, who also benefited from the money the U.S. pays to keep the corridor to Afghanistan open.
BN: Four issues immediately come to mind. First, the speed with which the Taliban has retaken power is pretty extraordinary and revelatory. The Taliban's re-rise to power isn't surprising, though most experts thought Kabul would last about 6 months. The incompetence and corruption and selfishness of the government and the country's security forces have sped up the timeline. Security forces and warlords and tribal leaders have cut deals, causing them to either switch sides or just melt away. Once all that quickly happened, President Ghani really had no choice but to flee to another country (he’s now in the UAE). The upshot, at least so far, is that the Taliban's advances have come with little bloodshed.
Second, like Vietnam, Iraq, and a number of other cases, Afghanistan goes into the dustbin of history as a failed case of nation building. The U.S. can say that it wasn't engaged in nation building anymore—not since the George W. Bush days—but that's exactly what it's been doing all along. Building an entire security force from scratch is nation building. Recruiting, vetting, training, funding, and equipping a new national military and police force is resource-draining, labor intensive, and extraordinarily difficult. And what we've found, unfortunately, is that a 20 year investment in Afghanistan's security apparatus has produced very little, as you point out. Afghanistan's security forces were names and numbers on paper, but that's about it. Clearly, they weren't particularly committed or loyal to the Afghan state, and they posed no defensive or deterrent capabilities. When push came to shove, they've opted for personal safety and enrichment rather than fighting for their country.
Third, the reaction to what's happening in Afghanistan—especially the reaction in the U.S.—has been pretty critical, and Biden is taking lots of heat, but this reaction is very myopic. The reality is that what we're seeing now in Afghanistan, as regrettable as it is, is what would happen whenever the U.S. decided to leave the country--whether this year or in ten years or in 50 years. The U.S. was propping up a dead carcass of a state, and things weren't going to get better anytime soon, if ever. This isn't a Biden issue. Oh sure, he's taking the political hits. But whomever decided to take the U.S. out of the country was going to face a crisis in Afghanistan and a political problem at home. The one good thing for Biden, I suppose, is that this is happening now, in his first year in office, well before the 2024 election season. There's plenty of time for the media and Americans to forget about the chaos and mayhem currently in Afghanistan.
Fourth, who in the Biden administration got Afghanistan so wrong? Clearly, Team Biden was caught way off guard. They absolutely didn't expect the Taliban to conquer the nation in a handful of days. And that's made Biden and staff look extremely incompetent. Biden infamously claimed that the Taliban wasn't going to seize Kabul anytime soon and that we wouldn't see a replay of Saigon in '75 (with rooftop departures and a mass, frantic exodus from the country). Wrong, on both counts. So, was that Biden's own personal take? If so, did he rebuff the advice and guidance of others in his administration? Or was Biden's view on Afghanistan influenced by others on his team or within the government? If so, who? Members of his cabinet? The Military? Intelligence? It's pretty breathtaking that the U.S. could be in Afghanistan for 20 years, occupying and calling the shots, yet fail to have even a little understanding of the politics and security of that nation. But that's how it often is for imperial powers in the end. The unpopular imperial overlords, suffering from overconfidence, narcissism, being completely out of touch and unengaged with the population, are eventually taken by surprise and are ousted from power and booted from the country.
YS: We don't have much difference in our opinion over this. Of course the more interesting question is: How will instability in Afghanistan and the Taliban in power influence global terrorism and regional stability?
BN: Any guesses regarding the regional and international security implications of these unfolding events in Afghanistan?
YS: None in the short run. In the long run, there will be a lot of problems. The Taliban is not united into one cohesive organization. It has factions, and once the spoils are divided, there will be clashes, especially with non-Pashtun groups. Al Qaeda is also still operating in Afghanistan and it will not completely obey the Taliban leadership and may even cause problems with China (Xinjiang), Pakistan, India, etc. And the Taliban will find it is much easier to fight the government than governing. Pakistan will probably find its policy of supporting the Taliban—in order to keep the Americans in Afghanistan and generate money from transit—will bite them in the end.
BN: What you're describing is a Libya-like scenario. And I agree that's probably the likeliest scenario for Afghanistan under Taliban "rule." I fully expect the Taliban to continue their extremely harsh, repressive ways internally. Already, there are early signs of that happening. That said, I do wonder if the group believes it has an incentive to act a bit more responsibly regionally and internationally—at least relative to its prior heyday in the 90s. Of course, the counter is that the Taliban likely feels really confident after outlasting the big bad U.S., and in the absence of the U.S. military it could well feel unrestrained and uninhibited to act as it pleases across the board—internally, domestically, and internationally. However, acting crazily carries great risks for the group. Does the group want to risk throwing away what it now has—unquestioned power in Afghanistan and major members of the international community seemingly prepared to accept it as the legitimate governing body—by provoking the ire of its neighbors and other big world powers? I mean, if we subscribe to the argument that the Taliban is irrational, then sure, expecting crazy behavior by the group is logical. But the group isn't irrational. We know that. Empirical studies illustrate that. (Check out Max Abrhams’ work.) The problem, as you point out, is that even if the senior leadership decides to act more responsibly externally, the group isn't a unified, singular entity, so splinter groups can cause trouble. And, yes, there's the al-Qaeda issue as well, though, as terrorism expert and scholar Dan Byman points out, “The risk of an al Qaeda comeback is real, but Afghanistan’s reversion to its pre-9/11 role as a safe haven for jihadi terrorism is unlikely.” He adds that “al Qaeda’s weakness, the Taliban’s own incentives, and post-9/11 improvements in U.S. intelligence coordination, homeland security, and remote military operations all reduce the threat [of al-Qaeda].” In the end, much is going to depend on the Taliban's willingness and ability to govern the country it now has a stranglehold over—a task that's much tougher than seizing power, as you incisively mention.
YS: This actually brings an interesting question: Why, after the United States spent 20 years stuck in a quagmire and spent lots of money to prop up a corrupt government, is there still no semblance of centralism in Afghanistan? Was it because the United States lacked commitment (e.g. fighting with one hand tied behind its back because the U.S. has to respect human rights and things like that)? Was corruption the only answer?
BN: I don’t think there’s much of a sense of an Afghan nation among its people. Loyalties run locally and tribally and ethnically much more than nationally. Nationalism runs only surface deep compared to other available political/cultural identities to the Afghan people. That's a problem when trying to construct a state (and all of its constituent parts) from scratch. It explains the likely difficulties the Taliban will face internally going forward. And it also accounts for why Afghanistan has been a very fragmented, hard-to-govern country for hundreds of years.
YS: Interestingly, most countries in Asia, Africa, and South America, comprised of many ethnicities/tribes, were grouped together by a colonial administrator (see Ben Anderson's Imagined Communities) and somehow they were able to craft a nationalistic identity. What makes Afghanistan a basket case? Maybe because the U.S. fought with one hand tied behind its back (for fear of accusations of human rights abuses)?
BN: I don't think the answer lies with the U.S.—what it did or didn't do. An outside force can't create a national identity for a foreign country. That's an organic, indigenous thing, something that has to come from within the country. The fact there's never been an effective multiethnic government that has provided meaningful political goods to Afghan citizens is the main factor here. That's meant there have always been groups resisting or unwilling to buy in to the state.
Last question. What's your take on how the U.S. left Afghanistan? Biden, as you know, is getting widespread criticism for how his administration has executed America's withdrawal. What are your thoughts on the war termination stage of America’s intervention in Afghanistan?
YS: At this point, there is simply no good option. Either the U.S. gets out and risks leaving civilians behind or goes back to the quagmire. Biden picked the first option. I agree with the criticism that he could have picked up more people sooner, or the departure could be managed much better.
I don't buy the argument that because Trump had initiated the withdrawal then Biden could not reverse it, or there are simply too few boots on the ground to manage the departure properly. While Trump could deservedly be blamed for saying that he would get out of Afghanistan by May, it cannot be denied that the buck stops at Biden's desk. At this point, whatever Trump promised has little to do with Biden. Biden has the power to postpone the departure until next year, or to do a quick surge, bringing everyone out, then leave. Yes, it will cost troops and money, and more criticism from the peanut gallery, but it can be done, and that's the option that Biden didn't pick.
And the U.S. is acting idiotically if it’s negotiating with the Taliban in a good faith. The group continues to break its word, so Biden, if he wanted to, could declare that negotiations are over, do a surge, then pull out, doing what Bush did in Iraq in 2008. While Bush made a monumental mistake by invading Iraq, I give him credit that Iraq was a bit better when the U.S. left. ISIS was caused by the incompetence of Prime Minister al-Maliki, who pushed a very sectarian policy. The rise of ISIS was not inevitable.
BN: Team Biden could've done a few things to make the situation slightly better. Undoubtedly, the White House should have coordinated with the Taliban ahead of time, rather than after the massive airlift has begun; gotten more people out sooner, as you stated; better secured the places needing short-term securing, like the embassy, airport; and at least tried to prevent the Taliban from getting its hands on billions of dollars of American weapons. The Biden administration does deserve blame for recklessly rushing to leave Afghanistan. The aforementioned suggestions would’ve made for a more compassionate and humane departure for the U.S., to be sure. Yet at the same time, those suggestions would’ve mostly yielded cosmetic improvements, making for better optics and press for Team Biden. In other words, we might not have seen as many dramatic pictures and videos coming out of Afghanistan. But that's about it, really.
A more organized, deliberate, and thoughtful departure from Afghanistan would NOT have altered the Taliban's rapid ascent to power. Why? Because none of those things would've impacted the fundamental variables in play—like the state of the Afghan government, the state of Afghan security forces, the strength and cohesion of the Taliban (esp. relative to the Afghan state). As I previously said, what we're seeing now is about what we'd see once the U.S. decided to leave, no matter when that happened and no matter who's POTUS. All of the vocal critics on social media and cable television have completely overlooked and ignored this likelihood. I guess it's much easier (and perhaps more fun) to play the “blame game” (whether to blame Bush, Trump, or Biden) than understand the political and security realities of Afghanistan.