The Ukraine Crisis: Headed Toward War or a De-Escalatory Off-Ramp?
I’m back with another brief conversation with my esteemed colleague Yohanes Sulaiman. Below, we tackle the ongoing hostilities involving Ukraine, the U.S., and Russia. What’s happening? And where does the crisis go from here?
Brad Nelson: How does the Ukraine crisis get solved? What would you do from this point forward if you were Joe Biden?
Yohanes Sulaiman: My working assumption is that Biden believes that Russia does not want to escalate, but Putin needs a face-saving concession to withdraw. At the same time, by conceding too much to Putin, Biden undermines Ukraine's and his own position in future disputes with Moscow. Thus, at this point, a medium escalation of putting 3,000 additional troops in Poland, as the U.S. has done, seems to be a good option. But the main problem still remains, which is finding Putin a good face saving excuse to deescalate/withdraw from the Ukrainian border.
BN: It seems like there are two issues here. One is the short-term problem of how to get Putin to back down and not invade Ukraine again. Your suggestion of finding a way to allow Putin to save face is a good one. The U.S. has been unwilling to make concessions to Putin during the negotiations over the last few months—likely for fear of looking weak, not just to other foes and rivals in the world, but to the GOP. Frankly, Biden is probably even more worried about being branded a weakling and a loser by the GOP, given that the 2022 mid-term elections are around the corner. Still, if Biden wants to put this issue to bed for a while, then he's going to have to budge a bit and budge first. He can't expect Russia to make the first move to step back, because of the asymmetrical interests at play. Russia values Ukraine much more than the U.S. does, and both sides know this.
If were Biden, I’d offer Putin a proposal to significantly shrink U.S./NATO-Ukraine military-security ties and assistance over time, as long as Russia doesn't invade or conquer Ukraine. I would see how that offer was received and negotiate around that. I would hope that Putin would find a reduced military assistance/partnership with the West to be a decent win, all things considered; and if Russia agrees to lay off Ukraine, well, then the West should feel less of an urgency to militarily prop up Kiev. Of course, Ukraine would be angry, feeling like the US sold it out. But in the end, the U.S. ought to be willing to put up with mouthy Ukrainian leaders in exchange for the avoidance of war.
The second issue is the problem of preventing a continual recurrence of the Russian threat to invade Ukraine. This problem centers on the relationship between Ukraine and the West. I'm sympathetic to those who argue that Ukraine's relationship with the U.S., EU, and NATO is Ukraine's to make and that Russia has no right to veto what Kiev wants to do. In a perfect world, they're right. But IR isn't a perfect, utopian landscape. It's an arena dominated by power politics. And in this specific case, Ukraine's alignment is something that will ultimately be decided by Russia and the U.S.
The best hope for the U.S., over the medium- to long-term, is to try to convince Russia to accept Ukraine as a buffer state between Russia and the West. The U.S. hasn't given up the dream of pulling Ukraine out of Moscow's orbit. But it's an ill-fated dream. Russia, particularly Putin, sees Ukraine as a part of its homeland. Ukraine is certainly within Russia's sphere of influence. By contrast, Ukraine has little cultural, historical, political, or strategic value to the U.S. Using Ukraine to poke and prod Russia carries more costs than benefits—as the last 8 years have shown. The U.S. should eventually cut its losses and stop longing for a Ukraine fully aligned with the West. Yes, it would be a bitter pill to swallow for Washington hawks. But a clear-eyed U.S. should see that getting Russia to view and treat Ukraine as a buffer state would actually be a major win for America. The real question about this suggestion is whether it's sustainable. Certainly, Russia would love for the U.S. to offer the buffer state option today. But how long would Russia be satisfied with it? My guess is that Moscow would be willing to accept that option over the medium-term, at a minimum, and if so, that would make Russian-U.S. relations much more stable for quite some time.
YS: The New York Times just published a nice article on why the U.S. is pushing Russia into a corner. Essentially, the Biden Administration learned a lesson from Obama’s failure to prevent Putin from annexing Crimea: The Obama White House didn't publicize Russia's movements, allowing Putin to gain the element of surprise that when the West finally realized what was going on, it was too late to reverse Russia's gains.
I agree that Russia finds Ukraine far more important than the U.S., and there is a domestic politics element going on here: Biden cannot show weakness, especially coming so soon after the Afghanistan withdrawal fiasco, because this will be exploited by Republicans. Republicans would seize on your proposed offer as evidence of Biden having no spine to stand up against Putin. Already tarred and feathered by the Democrats over Trump's coziness with Putin (the much discredited Steele's report, anyone?), the Republicans are far more willing to pay back the favor by denouncing Biden as too weak and feeble to fight Putin. The issue of Ukraine has already been so politicized so much in the U.S. that it is simply impossible for Biden to "give up" Ukraine.
Moreover, giving Putin the offer of shrinking U.S./NATO-Ukraine military-security ties will backfire. Putin would think that he can threaten the U.S. and get away with it, and this will completely freak out Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia. Granted, the Baltic States have a strong security commitment thanks to their membership in NATO, but remember that Estonia's membership in NATO still didn't prevent Russia's cyberattack on Estonia, and there are still sizeable Russian minorities in all Baltic States that could be used as an excuse by Russia to interfere.
Moreover, the U.S. has minimal trust in Putin and Russia. The Democrats believe that Putin interfered with U.S. politics and had a hand on Trump's victory, and Putin is toxic for Republicans. Plus, there is no guarantee that Putin won't create more problems down the road (e.g. seizing more of Ukraine's territory, or, as feared by the Baltic states, provoking the Russian minorities in the Baltic states). So how can the U.S. do a deal with Putin while simultaneously thinking that he could well break that deal in short order?
At this point, as I see it, the Ukraine crisis likely only gets solved if Putin stands down first. Putin can back down by claiming to be the “bigger man,” the actor who put his ego aside to avoid war and save lives. Or he could declare that the intelligence of him trying to invade Ukraine was wrong and that the U.S. was overhyping the threat of war. But I think Putin's strategy is to keep the troops where they currently are, with the hopes of tiring out the U.S., NATO, and Ukraine, believing that they will blink first.
BN: I do think you've touched on something interesting here: what the U.S. should do versus what's politically feasible. I underplayed the latter while emphasizing the former. In an ideal word, Biden—or any president dealing with this situation—would let Ukraine go. End all talk of NATO and the EU accepting Ukraine into the fold. But you're right: the Ukraine/Russia issue (or really, issues) is so politically toxic inside the U.S. that it's difficult for the POTUS to make meaningful first-move concessions to defuse the crisis. Biden has domestic political incentives to act the tough guy vis-a-vis Putin.
The media war-hype machine is in overdrive here in the U.S., and most prognosticators seem to believe Putin is hell-bent on conquering more of Ukraine and that war is imminent. I’m not so sure about this expectation. While Putin is clearly willing to threaten war to make his point, I don't think he wants a war, particularly one in which the U.S. is involved as an external backer of Ukraine—either arming Ukraine or organizing an anti-Russian insurgency. A war in Ukraine in 2022 won’t resemble what happened in 2014—and Putin surely knows this.
What’s more likely, I believe, is more talks, more shuttle diplomacy, and eventually minor concessions made so that Biden and Putin can save face. All of that may well reduce hostilities between all sides for the time being, though that won't resolve the situation. Instead, that will just kick the can down the road, prolonging the frozen conflict.
Perhaps my prediction isn’t so smart, given today’s reports of shelling near the line of control in Ukraine. The uptick in violence is being widely interpreted by media outlets as ominous, portending something bigger and larger coming soon. Perhaps, I suppose. But there is a stark difference between separatists on both sides exchanging fire, as terrible as that is, and a ground invasion by Russian forces stationed on Ukraine’s borders.
YS: I agree that in the end there won't be war. There will be posturing, but both sides will agree on some minor concessions and kick the can down the road. That said, time is probably something that Putin lacks. He is growing old and his covid policy is a mess. While a lot of doomsayers about Putin have been proven wrong, perhaps this could be Putin's last hurrah. That may explain Russia's extreme demands to de-escalate the conflict. Still, considering how prepared NATO currently is, I don't think Russia can no longer entertain a quick painless victory like it did back in 2014. This could be far messier, and that is enough of a deterrent.