The Taiwan Debate
Below is a conversation I’ve had this week with my colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman. Our discussion looks at the Taiwan-U.S.-China relationship, explores whether a “window of opportunity” has opened for China to seize Taiwan, and thinks about how the U.S. might try to avoid “conflict spirals” with China.
Brad Nelson: As you know, there's considerable debate about Taiwan these days in China, in the U.S., and around the world. What do you think is driving this debate? For instance, is this debate simply a product of China's growth in power and America's decline? Or are other factors driving the conversation about Taiwan?
Yohanes Sulaiman: Well, the usual variables: power and the perception of it. China's is growing and becoming more belligerent, China sees the U.S. as a declining power, and Taiwan is growing weak militarily vis-a-vis China. That in turn raises the question of whether the regional status quo is tenable. I wrote a post on the CWCP blog a few years ago about someone who suggested that the U.S. ditch Taiwan in exchange for debt relief from China, so I don’t really think talk about abandoning Taiwan is anything new.
What is missing here in the debate is what Taiwan wants. That is really important. Of course, one may argue that the U.S. does not have the will to defend Taiwan, but at the same time, Taiwan is strategically located, and is a lynchpin for the U.S. military in Asia.
BN: Scholars and analysts are concerned that some leaders in the US and China have argued that the window for conflict over Taiwan is opening up fast. That means America’s longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity probably isn't sustainable over the long-term. China is increasingly pressuring Taiwan and US deterrence is becoming strained.
Of course, though, the tough talk from the U.S. and China could be a bluff. In other words, one or both sides could be inflating the gravity of the situation and the likelihood of war to send coercive signals to the other side. This carries risks, however. Ginning up war fever could make the situation unmanageable, especially for the Chinese. After all, Taiwan is a sovereignty/national identity issue for China. When/if Taiwan becomes a major flashpoint, nationalism in China is going to run high, and that will make it even tougher for Xi (or his successors) to back down against the U.S. over the fate of Taiwan.
Based on polling data, we know what Taiwan wants. It wants to be free and independent. And it sees itself in those terms. It sees itself as an autonomous state with its own unique institutions and national identity. Taiwan views itself as distinct from China. That said, I'm not sure what Taiwan thinks or wants is relevant, though. Its fate is dependent on the power and interests of external players. Indeed, it's far more important to know whether other states in the world see Taiwan as an independent state, care about its status, and, most importantly, are willing to do what it takes to preserve Taiwan's autonomy. At this point, I suspect most of the world views Taiwan as independent (regardless of whether they formally recognize it as such), cares somewhat about its status, but certainly isn't going to go to bat for Taiwan diplomatically or militarily.
YS: The idea that it is "now or never" is based on the power transition theory, and as we all know, while the theory makes sense, it is very difficult to know when the transition happens. Putting that aside, yes, everyone pays lip service to "one China," but I agree with you that the world de facto views Taiwan as independent. Unlike you, however, I think they care about whether China is going to take over Taiwan peacefully or violently. If China is going to do a hostile takeover on Taiwan, it will scare every single country in East-Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America, making life difficult for China in the long run. That is the only thing that prevents China from invading Taiwan.
BN: I agree with you in a sense: the bloodier the takeover of Taiwan, the more likely China would draw widespread opprobrium from the international community. That assumes China captures Taiwan via an all-out war. What if China takes control over Taiwan in a salami slicing fashion—which it's arguably doing now—then how does the world respond? I suspect most of the world would make minor criticisms here and there and then watch Taiwan's independence slip away. Hong Kong is a good guide, frankly. Nobody really cares all that much that Hong Kong, as the world knew it under British control, doesn't exist. And certainly nobody has been prepared to do anything about Hong Kong's freedoms being trampled by China. I'd bet roughly the same thing would happen if China seized Taiwan with limited violence and bloodshed. Oh sure, Taiwan is more important than Hong Kong economically and strategically, and such a move would generate a bigger reaction. But in the end, most nations, including many of America's allies in Europe, want access to China’s consumers, money, cheap goods, and cheap labor, and would put up with quite a bit of nefarious behavior by Beijing just to ensure their economic relationship with China continues in an uninterrupted manner.
YS: China can do anything it wants with Hong Kong because of how Hong Kong's administration is structured: Beijing holds all levers of power (e.g. an assembly dominated by Beijing-picked legislators, a Chief Executive that is picked by Beijing, etc.). And the Basic Law is something that Beijing can legally revoke at any time. Plus, it can simply send troops and law enforcement officers to Hong Kong anytime it wants.
Taiwan is completely independent, with a very cautious government and legislature dominated by anti-Beijing politicians. In fact, Taiwanese watched what happened in Hong Kong with horror, and that contributed to the re-election of President Tsai Ing Wen in the 2020 election. In fact, before the crackdown in Hong Kong, she was trailing her challenger, yet in the end, she won by almost 20%. This led the opposition Kuomintang to abandon its pro-Beijing orientation in order to survive.
While Beijing can seize the islands of Quemoy and Matsu and various small islands close to its shore as a part of its "salami slicing" strategy, then what? The rest of Taiwan's territory is across the strait, near the main island. An invasion of islands so close to Taiwan's main island would lead to war. China can pull a salami tactic in the South China Sea because while the South China Sea is important, all claimant states know that China won't invade their core territory. There is no way Chinese troops will invade Manila, Hanoi, or Kuala Lumpur over disputes in the South China Sea. But Taiwan knows that China considers it as a part of its territory, so it won't react lightly to Chinese aggression.
BN: I mostly agree with what you stated. Nevertheless, none of that addresses the likelihood that external players (except for the U.S.) won't do all that much to prop up Taiwan diplomatically and militarily if it is threatened, as it arguably is now. The main factor many scholars and experts focus on these days is the power relationship between the U.S. and China. And that is important in many ways. But the other really important factor is the extent to which China's large, booming economy has made so much of the world quiescent in their response to China's various misdeeds and aggression. Expectations of big and ongoing trade and investment benefits have effectively muted and blunted European, Middle Eastern, African, even Asian, concerns and opposition to China on a wide range of issues, including China’s “re-education” camps in Xinjiang. They want stability in their relations with China and seek to avoid getting involved in any hot button China-related issue. Dale Copeland's work on trade expectations is probably really insightful on this topic. In the end, I don't expect a large coalition to buttress Taiwan's security and confront China regarding Taiwan. It'll be left to the U.S. to do the dirty work.
And that begs some (obvious) questions: Will the US be there for Taiwan if its independence is gravely threatened? Should it be there for Taiwan? Or should the U.S., as Charles Glaser suggested, be prepared to abandon Taiwan, de-prioritizing it below other American interests in the broader Indo-Pacific?
YS: Taiwan is the world's largest semiconductor manufacturer with much more advanced technology than China, so letting it fall into China's hands means that China controls global semiconductor manufacturing, something that it can’t do at this point. And I do think the European Union will be involved in a Taiwan crisis—simply because the fall of Taiwan would create a precedent that the bloc won't like. I recall a conference a few years back, when a Chinese scholar asked a law scholar from the European Union why the EU cared about the South China Sea crisis. The law scholar bluntly said that China was creating precedent. So, the European Union probably would be involved in a Taiwan crisis. Yes, it didn't get involved in Crimea, but Taiwan is a de facto independent state with a well-functioning democracy, which is different from Russia taking away the small Crimean peninsula while leaving the rest of Ukraine intact. It is basically a bridge too far, a major assault on the norms of the post-World War II era.
At this point, it is a matter of both reputation and strategic position. Abandoning Taiwan will destroy America’s credibility in East and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian nations would ask why they should rely on the U.S. when the U.S. abandons one of its closest allies—and a democratic one to boot. Japan and South Korea would likely push for nukes, and some Southeast Asian countries would either bandwagon with China or increase their arms spending. A disruption to the status quo would cause massive damage to American national security.
BN: Sure, that kind of instability is bad for the Indo-Pacific, but is it bad for the U.S.? Too often the retrenchment argument is reflexively dismissed in scholarly and policy debates. In my view, the U.S. would suffer some costs, particularly because of the knock-on economic consequences. Plus, the U.S. would have to invest quite a bit of time and resources in clearly and credibly explaining to South Korea and Japan that the U.S. values them more than Taiwan. Glaser thinks it can be done. I suspect you don't, and that's fair. It is widely assumed that removing America's security umbrella from Taiwan would create wider regional strategic opportunities for China. Possibly. However, it could also result in China getting bogged down in dealing with an array of new problems in its own neighborhood, which would be great for the U.S., quite honestly
China is going to expand to the extent that others let it do so. If there is little to no external resistance to China, then Beijing will expand as far as it can go. It's natural. It's the story of how great powers behave. Once they reach the summit of great power status, as offensive realists argue, nations don't stop; rather, they continue to search for ways to expand their power and influence regionally and globally. So unless the U.S. wants to outright cede the Indo-Pacific to China, then it better be prepared to stand up to Beijing. At this point, that's no longer an issue. Almost everyone in Washington is on board the containment train. The real puzzle is how the U.S. can stand up to Beijing in a way that's efficient, good for the U.S., and not particularly provocative or counterproductive. In short, what's a good deterrent policy on Taiwan that doesn't spark a "spiral model" in Sino-U.S. relations? What do you think?
YS: The ball is obviously in China's hands. I doubt the U.S. will unnecessarily provoke China over Taiwan. And regardless of how much Taiwan rearms, it is still weaker than China. The U.S. will maintain the status quo, but the start of the spiral will be on China.
BN: If Richard Haass and David Sacks have their way, the U.S. would revoke the policy known as strategy ambiguity for a far more transparent call to defend Taiwan. They write: "The policy known as strategic ambiguity has, however, run its course. Ambiguity is unlikely to deter an increasingly assertive China with growing military capabilities. The time has come for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity: one that makes explicit that the United States would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan." This policy shift would most definitely provoke China, though they would disagree. I don't see Biden adopting this policy change, though it could happen in future years by his successor.
Moreover, I can imagine any of a number of additional scenarios in which a future hawkish U.S. administration, abetted by a hawkish anti-China Congress, says/writes/does something that is meant to fortify America's commitment to Taiwan's security and designed to protect the status quo, but is perceived by China as provocative and hostile. For instance, Michael Beckley suggests the "United States could install a high-tech ‘minefield’ in the area by prepositioning missile launchers, armed drones, and sensors at sea and on allied territory near China’s coastline. These diffuse networks of munitions would be tough for China to neutralize and would not require large bases or fancy platforms. Instead, they could be installed on almost anything that floats or flies, including converted merchant ships, barges, and aircraft."
Beckley is delusional if he thinks that China would sit idly by and let the U.S. restrict China's ability to move throughout the Taiwan Strait, let alone significantly impede its chances of seizing Taiwan. This would be perceived by China as significantly upping the stakes. Unfortunately, I can see the U.S. eventually doing some if not all of those things, regardless of what China does.
My concern is that a containment/deterrent strategy and related policies will produce, if not a new cold war, then at least many of the excesses of the cold war era. During the first 10-15 years of this century, much of the debate and discussion about China was dominated by pro-economic engagement types and liberal institutionalists. But because engagement is widely seen as a failed approach, it's been discredited. These days the debate has been hijacked by the neocons and the liberal internationalists, two sides of the same coin in terms of relishing conflict and violence in the name of some higher cause (think freedom, democracy, and so on). I think the U.S. needs to start thinking about infusing its Taiwan policy with some common sense restraint before things get out of hand.
It might sound far-fetched, but I recommend a Taiwan summit involving China, the U.S., and maybe Taiwan, though China probably wouldn't allow the latter to participate. Sure, China sees Taiwan as an internal issue and would certainly resist any efforts to talk about it with the U.S., or any other state or international body for that matter, and that would be a major obstacle to a future summit. Still, I think the U.S. should probe whether there's anything it can do to get China to discuss Taiwan. I recommend that this summit not focus much on the fate of Taiwan, but on establishing rules of the road that can guide the external policies and actions of all three sides. In my view, that could go a long way toward muffling the spiral model.
YS: It is far-fetched. There's no way China would allow a China-U.S.-Taiwan summit with or without Taiwan's participation, as that would legitimize America’s interference in China's internal affairs, since China considers Taiwan as a part of it.
BN: I don't disagree, though it's worthwhile for the U.S. to make an attempt to talk it out with China on this issue. Again, the emphasis in such hypothetical talks shouldn't be on the status of Taiwan, but on establishing and implementing rules of the road that the three actors can live with. If the sides can't even discuss setting up rules of the road, then how is war averted down the line? China is growing more powerful and nationalistic, and Xi seems to want the Taiwan issue settled during his reign. China is pressing outward in almost all directions, including into the Taiwan Strait. While war over Taiwan isn't probable, it is more likely today than it was just a few years ago. So what is America’s plan to avoid war? Deterrence? Retrenchment and abandonment? Hoping Xi has a change of heart? Luck? Given the importance that China places on Taiwan, Beijing is not going to give up or wait forever to press the issue further. What happens then? Now is the time to explore conflict resolution measures, before the situation has dangerously spiraled out of control. If a summit is a no-go for China, then the White House should go back to the drawing board, get creative, and come up with another proposal, preferably one that protects U.S. interests, reduces the chance for war, and stabilizes the U.S.-Taiwan-China triangle.