Taking Stock of the Latest Palestinian-Israeli Violence
Assessing the Causes and Consquences, and More
My new Substack page is now up and running! Welcome aboard and thanks for reading. My first post here is a conversation I’ve had over the last week with my colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman. Below we discuss the latest round of violence between the Palestinians and Israelis.
Brad Nelson: I'm curious, what are your thoughts on the latest conflict between Israel and the Palestinians? In particular, do you think this violence is something new and different? Or is it something that's fundamentally similar, just another part of the endless and repetitive cycle of violence between Israel and Hamas (and other anti-Israeli actors)?
Yohanes Sulaiman: I don't see anything different in this recent round of conflict. Arab states condemn Israel, but I presume behind the scenes they wink and nod to Israel, saying that it will be business as usual. Israel has damaged Hamas, but it hasn’t destroyed the group. Interestingly, Hezbollah hasn’t interfered. Similarly, Iran is surprisingly quiet.
BN: Here's my take. In terms of the Israeli-Hamas-Fatah relationship, the fundamentals really haven't changed. Fatah is too weak to impose control over Hamas. Hamas uses violence to maintain its anti-Israeli credentials and to distract from its poor governance record in Gaza. Other extremist groups, like Islamic Jihad, are still chomping at the bit to pile on whenever violence explodes in Gaza. Israel continues to vigorously, perhaps disproportionately, respond to Hamas attacks for fear of looking weak and emboldening extremists in the broader Middle East. And if anything, Hamas and Israel have even larger than normal incentives to resort to violence, given Netanyahu's political and personal futures (which are cloudy) and the possibility (however remote) of Palestinian elections. Both actors are looking for rally-around-the-flag-effects to bolster their prospects going forward.
The one thing that's different is that all of this started as an intra-Israeli struggle, not because of external forces and actors beyond Israeli boundaries. Hamas wasn't involved in the early rounds here; instead, it opportunistically jumped into an already ongoing combustible situation. After all, the initial turmoil was the result of the possible forced evictions of Palestinian families from their homes in Israel and the rough treatment of Palestinians by Israeli authorities at the Temple Mount. Those actions provoked protests, riots, and street battles inside of Israel, contributing to inter-communal tensions and violence. The Palestinian-Israeli battles inside of Israel is a new dimension here, and it's added an extra layer of complexity to an already complicated environment.
BN: You mentioned the reaction of Arab states. How do you think the Abraham Accords have impacted the events in and involving Israel? And does the violence undermine the meaning and value of the Abraham Accords--as some Never Trumpers have suggested on social media?
YS: The Abraham Accords are a formalization of something that has already existed. They are a big deal because they basically put into open all the deals Israel and the Arab states have discussed behind the scenes. Furthermore, most Arab states no longer prioritize the Israel-Palestine dispute, as it is viewed as a minor irritant. So Arab states do condemn Israel, but for them, Israel's existence is far more beneficial compared to a Hamas-dominated Palestine or the corrupt and powerless Palestinian Authority. So I don't believe the violence will cause a rupture in the Abraham Accords. Like it or not, Palestine is just a pawn in the chessboard.
BN: I agree. Plus, I would add that the Abraham Accords really weren’t about peace at all, even though that's how they were hyped. As a result, then, the ongoing violence doesn't say anything about the Abraham Accords. The Abraham Accords, which were driven by the US, was all about getting U.S. Arab allies in the Middle East to put aside their differences with Israel so they can better collectively balance against Iran. That's it. In effect, the Accords are a way to enable the US to transition to offshore balancing in the ME. The goal of the Trump administration, apparently, was to get out of Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, and then let an Arab-Israeli coalition deal with regional threats, particularly from Iran. That said, the ongoing violence does strain that coalition—as Arab publics aren't happy about Israel right now—and it does delay the possibility of Saudi Arabia officially normalizing ties with Israel.
YS: It is doubtful that Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Israel even without this violence. It is basically their last card to play. Once a normalization deal is consummated, the Saudis lose their leverage to pressure and cajole Israel.
In any case, in the long run, nobody cares. Palestine is no longer a crucial issue for many in the Middle East, particularly considering that Israel is a status quo state and Iran is a revisionist state that’s alarmed the Sunni powers.
BN: What's your take on how the Biden administration has handled this crisis? As you know, Biden is getting hammered simultaneously on multiple fronts. Both the left (which is incensed that Biden gave Netanyahu carte blanche to attack Gaza) and the right (GOP leaders see this as a political football in which they can score points) have lobbed barbs at the White House. But beyond that, Biden's received some media criticism for being caught off guard and unprepared to deal with the violence.
YS: Well, it seems that both Israel and Palestinian have settled on a truce and the Biden administration is doing a victory lap. I tend to agree with Biden’s approach to the conflict, though. It is much better to engage in diplomacy behind the scenes, pushing for the Egyptians or other Middle Eastern powers to take a more proactive role. A Trump-like approach would have caused more problems, inflaming tensions. Of course, it is questionable whether Biden's pressure was what drove the cease-fire or the fact that Hamas is simply exhausted. It is doubtful that either Hamas or Israel would agree for cease-fire unless they felt pressured.
BN: The Biden administration politically and diplomatically supported Israel. It gave Israel cover in the UN. And Joe Biden, Jen Psaki (White House Press Secretary), Ned Price (State Department Spokesperson), and Antony Blinken (Secretary of State), among others, verbally made the case for the legality and necessity of Israeli self-defense in the face of incoming rockets from Hamas. In this sense, then, Biden followed traditional US foreign policy. It was tough, because he had to hold off the left and far left, which views Israel and this round of violence differently than Biden does. If it wasn't evident before, by now it's clear that there are sharp political and policy divisions within the Democratic Party. This is something to keep in mind over the next 4 years while Biden is in office.
Biden's an old school, traditionalist when it comes to foreign policy, and I think that informed quite a bit of his approach to the situation. I also wonder if he believes that by giving Israel space to crush Hamas, he’s gained a bargaining chip that he can cash in later. Perhaps a muted Israeli response to a revived Iran nuclear deal? I also think there has been some self-preservation by the Biden administration here. I'm sure the longer the violence went on, the more uncomfortable the White House was in supporting the Israeli mission. But to express that openly risks taking considerable heat from the GOP and facing an irritable, uncooperative Netanyahu down the line. Better to do that behind closed doors, out of the public's eye, as you suggested.
In the end, Biden made the calculation that Israel means more to him and to US national interests than do the Palestinians. He's right. But then that raises the issue of who stands up for the Palestinians. Nobody, evidently. As you mentioned, the salience of the issue in the region—and the world—has declined significantly in recent years. The regional governments most willing to express support for the Palestinians at this point might be Iran or Turkey, but neither is a serious broker or defender of the Palestinians. This leads to my main critique of Team Biden. It could've been far more sympathetic to the plight of ordinary Palestinians caught in the crossfire. It would've taken little effort and humanity to express sorrow for their plight (not necessarily their cause), but the White House chose not to do so. I'm guessing that's because Biden likely thought voicing anything that could be interpreted as concern for the Palestinians would be used as a political cudgel by Republicans and create trouble in the US-Israeli relationship. Regardless, it's unfortunate.
BN: Lastly, now that we have a cease-fire and the “hot war” looks to be over, at least for now, who are your winners and losers? Or have all involved parties lost?
YS: It depends on what you mean by "win" or "lose." Hamas is beaten but they can fight for another day. The group lost a lot of facilities and missiles, but as we see from the last wars in 2012 and 2014, it can easily rebuild. As long as the organization remains intact, groups like Hamas will chalk this episode up as another struggle won, that the big bad Goliath cannot destroy it. So there is no way Hamas will admit that it lost. And to boot, Hamas can claim that it is the only one fighting for Palestinian rights while the Palestinian Authority is twiddling its thumbs. So simply due to optics, Hamas wins even though it accomplished nothing.
The same goes for Israel. Israel basically fought with its hands tied behind its back due to international scrutiny, and thus was unable to invade Gaza. There are no changes in the status quo. And this time we don't see Hamas attacks leading to greater regional problems, and none of the Arab states withdrew from the Abraham Accords. Israel blunted Hamas' claws and will chalk it up as another win.
Thus, we are back to the status quo, and does that count as a win or a loss?
In the long run, though, it seems to me that western opinion has moved against Israel, and this may cause problems for Israel in the long run.
Most reporting and analysis have given Netanyahu a victory, because the conflict might help him remain in power. But I am not that sure about that. The war ended inconclusively, and that could cause political problems for him. But if he survives and remains the prime minister, then Hamas' attacks did him a favor and he can thank Hamas for that.
BN: I see the big winners as Netanyahu and Egypt. Netanyahu has already declared Israel a big winner. I'm not sure that Israel won, but he did. Netanyahu likely helped his political fortunes. Because he can make a credible argument that his government won the conflict and significantly degraded Hamas capabilities, he'll probably win the next election, remain in office, and hold off any criminal charges for a bit longer. On macro level, though, Netanyahu is doing Israel no favors. By stoking nationalism and embracing the far right, he's probably doing damage to Israeli politics and security over the long-term.
Egypt also scored some points. It played a big role in mediating between Hamas and Israel, and can claim credit in brokering the cease-fire. In doing so, Egypt has highlighted its continued importance in the region. It also likely helped al-Sissi win the good graces of Team Biden, which has shunned him and criticized his human rights record. According to The Washington Post: "After the cease-fire announcement, Biden expressed his ‘sincere gratitude’ to Sissi and his mediation team for playing ‘such a critical role in this diplomacy.’ Hours earlier, during a phone call, Biden and Sissi agreed to ‘stay closely in touch,’ according to a White House statement."
The big losers are the Palestinians and the Arab Israelis. The Palestinians, as mentioned already, are caught in the crossfire between Israel and various extremists, like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others. They suffer the destruction and devastation of conflict and violence. Moreover, there's no external player—no state or international body—that's willing to go to bat for them in a meaningful way. So their terrible plight will continue, no matter that the violence for today is over. The Arab Israelis have also lost. The cease-fire doesn't deal with the internal communal and political issues that plague Israel. And a confident, buoyed Netanyahu, in league with right and far right factions, is highly unlikely to address the issues that are angering Arab Israelis. Indeed, despite the cease-fire, on Friday, there were clashes at the al-Aqsa mosque, showing that tensions inside Israel are still high.
It's a mixed bag for Hamas and the U.S. Hamas gets to claim that it went toe to toe with Israel again, standing up for and defending Palestinians. On the other hand, Hamas is now militarily exhausted, its missile supplies are low, its tunnels are destroyed, and it has a massive humanitarian problem on its hands. Palestinian elections, which it might have won, are shelved and might not happen anytime soon. If anything, Hamas is lucky that Israel didn't go further in crushing the group. As you said, "it lives for another day." That in itself is a minor victory. Meantime, Team Biden received considerable criticism in the U.S. for its early performance during the crisis. And Biden will have to smooth out its foreign policy differences on the left if he wants the U.S. to be a world leader again. But at the same time, the White House did play a helpful, beneficial role behind the scenes, working to limit the duration and the violence of the conflict. (This bout of violence wasn’t as long or bloody as the 2014 flare-up.) And I think the US came out of the conflict with better relations with Israel and Egypt, which is a good thing. There's no way Biden can even begin to construct an effective Middle East policy if he's facing headwinds from America's friends in the region.