Spiraling Violence Between and Israel and Iran
The below conversation between my colleague Yohanes Sulaiman and I took place over the last week—in the period right after Iran’s attack on Israel on April 13th until yesterday, April 19th.
Brad Nelson: Now that Iran has launched a barrage of drone and missile strikes on Israel, what happens next? Where does the Israel-Iran confrontation go?
Yohanes Sulaiman: This is actually my first time thinking that the Iranian mullahs are more predictable than Netanyahu. Iran knows its limit: it can only hit so much before causing a much stronger response. I doubt that there will be another direct attack from Iran to Israel in the near future. The problem is Netanyahu. He really needs this conflict to divert the public's attention from his incompetence and all his criminal cases. He also needs to keep all the crazies in his coalition. In order to do that, he can’t make a compromise and must go all out against his enemy-of-the-day. Hamas is getting too risky due to international pressure. Iran will be the one threat that generates support and sympathy, especially from Riyadh.
BN: Biden has the right idea. He told Netanyahu to declare a "win"—that 99% of the drones and missiles either malfunctioned or were shot down and little damage was caused, and that it was a multinational effort to ward off Iran (Israel, the U.S., France, and Jordan), which shows that Israel isn't quite as isolated as the chattering classes say—and don't respond to Iran with further force, let the hostilities simmer, and focus on Hamas and wrapping up that conflict. That's the smart thing to do. It keeps the war limited and focused, and the costs manageable. That's not the case if Israel responds to Iran with a major punch. After all, if Israel responds in kind to Iran, with similar or higher levels of force than Iran used against it, continuing this tit-for-tat confrontation, there's the risk that this conflict escalates. Yes, that's not what Iran wants, but another big show of force from Israel could push hardliners and even centrists in Iran, feeling nationalist pressure, to respond with even greater force. And at that point, both sides are at war. In fact, Israel would likely be at war on four fronts (Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, Houthis), with the original conflict with Hamas just one theater and probably a minor one relative to the big fish in Iran. Does Netanyahu really want to embark on a four-front war? Especially at a time in which there's significant domestic pressure from Biden's left to reduce/curtail military aid to Israel and a swath of Biden supporters threatening to defect if he doesn’t call for an end to the war with Hamas?
I worry that Israel sees the situation opportunistically—that this is its chance to defang all of its adversaries at once. It could turn into a very bloody affair. The ripple effects could cause a wave violence and instability throughout the Middle East. And America’s role in an escalating Israeli crisis is unclear given that it is an election year for Biden. Certainly, Biden would want to assist Israel, and Netanyahu may assume this, but U.S. domestic politics could scramble Biden’s (and Netanyahu’s) plans.
BN: What do you expect Israel to do now? Does it respond to Iran with force? And if so, what does that look like? Does Israel target Iran directly or go after Iranian proxies?
YS: At this point, again, the biggest fear is Netanyahu and his coalition are underestimating what Iran is capable of doing, seeing that Israel (and the U.S. and other Arab States) managed to intercept the majority of the drones and the missiles. That, I guess, made Biden warn Netanyahu that the U.S. will not support any attempt from Netanyahu to broaden the conflict. At the same time, like I mentioned earlier, Netanyahu has a different calculus. He is figuring out how to broaden the conflict without tripping the red line, in the sense of what Iran's red line is. There is no appetite for anyone in the region for a war, well except Netanyahu and the rest of his cabinet. I suspect we will see a "minor" escalation, notably more strikes on Iran's proxies. But frankly, at this point, I will NOT be surprised if Netanyahu somehow ends up directly attacking Iran. Of course, most likely he will be restrained by his Minister of Defense, but then again, when your political survival is in line, one will tend to pick the most extreme option available, to divert others' attention from their incompetence.
BN: Sure, it’s possible that Israel could underestimate Iran. After Israel (with help) knocked down Iran's drones and missiles and avoided much damage, it's conceivable that Netanyahu and his war cabinet would think that Iran is a lightweight and there's nothing to fear from a big attack on Iran. I think that would be misguided by Israel. Moreover, I doubt that Israel is overconfident or that it's underestimating Iran right now. Israel is well aware that Iran has lots of tools in its arsenal, particularly though not exclusively in the form of a wide array of proxies throughout the Middle East, and they could make life very difficult for Israelis.
Israel is sending signals that it will go ahead and respond to Iran with force. The question now is whether Israel will escalate the situation, using greater force than Iran did, or will it respond in a de-escalatory manner, with less force than Iran used on April 13. A de-escalatory strike would show Iran that Israel just wants to have the last strike and isn't interested in provoking a larger, graver confrontation with Iran. Of course, even here there are issues, because another Israeli strike means that active hostilities are continuing and the confrontation isn't over, as Iran could similarly seek to have the last strike before ending the armed standoff. Still, a de-escalatory strike is better than an escalatory one—the latter of which you seem to think that Israel could pursue, and you could be right. I'm not sure. I don't have a good sense of which direction Israel is headed. That said, if Biden and his team don't believe they can dissuade Netanyahu from using force against Iran, then they should be pushing Israel to use force in a way that lowers the temperature and hostilities rather than ratchets them upward—a precise, limited well-telegraphed (though intermediaries) strike that doesn’t result in collateral damage, harm Iran’s core interests, or lend itself to misperceptions or misunderstandings. That would be a best case scenario.
BN: All right, we now have the answer to the ongoing debate about what Israel would do. It has sent retaliatory drone strikes into Iran, attacking a military base near the city of Isfahan. Now that the Israel’s response has been completed, what do you make of it? What's your reaction?
YS: It is a half-hearted assault, just to have the last word. Neither Israel nor Iran is interested in escalating things further, especially with Biden telling Netanyahu that the latter should not expect any support from the U.S. If Israel was serious, Iran wouldn't be able to shoot those drones down. Thankfully the cooler heads have prevailed. But still, the problems remain: Gaza and Netanyahu's political survival. And with them, the clashes will likely continue. Gaza gives the justification for Iran and its proxies to keep attacking, while Netanyahu's political survival depends on him and his ilk to keep Israel on the warpath.
BN: Yes, unfortunately, a number of problems remain (Hamas, Gaza, Hezbollah, the Houthis), but that's for another day. Right now, it's good that Israel chose a de-escalatory strike against Iran. It was a small strike, confined to a military base, resulting in no casualties or deaths. So far reports say that Israel didn't hit any missile sites or any nuclear facilities. It was a far smaller attack than the one Iran launched against Israel on the 13th. The point of it, it seems, was to show Iran that Israel could strike Iran when it wished and there's nothing Iran can do about it. Regardless, auspicious news is that Iran has downplayed Israel's attack. It matters less that Israel and the U.S. characterize Israel's attack as small or limited and more that Iran has apparently minimized it. Social media reports quickly indicated that Iranian media made light of the tiny size of Israel's drones, dismissed any on-ground impact of the attack, and quickly shifted coverage to other topics. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian even suggested that the drones “were like toys” and “did not come from Israel.” All are good signs.
Iran is probably going to let Israel's attack stand as the last word for now, unless Israel undertakes further action. As you said, it's nice that cooler heads are prevailing, though, and I suspect you would agree, that this de-escalation isn't equivalent or leading to an off-ramp of hostilities between both sides. The open wound is still there, it's just that both sides have decided not to pick at it, aggravate it, further for now.
YS: It seems to me that Iran will focus back on their proxies. And Israel will willingly oblige. The only thing that I find curious is that every single Iranian proxy must have realized by now that they are just sacrificial pawns in the cold war between Israel and Iran, and as this shows, Iran will gladly play down Israel's attack and de-escalate because the mullahs and the IRGC don't want to get a bloody nose. And at the same time, Iran doesn't give a damn about the deaths of the proxies' leadership and their families. So why are they still willingly killing themselves for Iran's sake? Is it because they know that they can't rely on anyone else except Iran and that once Iran pulls its support, the entire structure will just tumble down?
BN: That’s correct. Iran's proxies are willing to stick it out with Tehran because of a lack of options. If Iran turned off the spigot, these groups would be screwed. Who or what would support and back them? Not the Sunni states. The Sunnis won't back Shia groups, and they loathe Hamas. Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq are war-torn, unstable, and dependent on external aid to prop up their economies. They’re not in a position to take over Iran’s portfolio. Perhaps Russia could fill in the gaps, given that it the means and the motives. I suspect Moscow's urge to control the proxies would increase as its support to them grew—much like how Moscow took control over the Wagner Group--which would be an issue for the proxies. North Korea? Pyongyang doesn’t have the funds, but it does have arms. Nevertheless, the distance between the Middle East and North Korea means that there'd be a great risk that any weapons pipeline could get periodically disrupted or even severed, which would be destabilizing to the proxies.
In the end, I would think that Iran's proxies would have to turn into perpetual begging enterprises—relying on the solicitation of money, arms, and anything else valuable from whoever and wherever they could, with much of it coming from local non-state actors (corrupt local officials, criminals, drug lords, terrorists, and other shady folks).