Russia's War on Ukraine
Below is a conversation with my esteemed colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman on the latest developments in Ukraine. Our discussion attempts to make sense of what’s currently happening there, understand the factors underpinning Putin’s decision to wage war, and figure out how we misjudged the likelihood for war in our last post.
Brad Nelson: While don't know yet how far Putin is willing to go in Ukraine or what he ultimately wants with Ukraine in this military intervention, it's clear that he's pursuing a war that's much more expansive than we anticipated. What’s your take on what’s happened so far?
Yohanes Sulaiman: It is simple game theory.
Putin had two options: cooperate (not going to war) and defect (war). For him, the payoff for defecting is much higher than cooperating, since by attacking Ukraine, he is basically questioning the credibility of both the U.S. and NATO's commitment to guarantee Ukraine's safety. If he wins the war, Ukraine and Georgia (already flirted with NATO) will be squarely in Moscow's orbit. And he is sure that there is no appetite for war in Washington and European capitals: war is deeply unpopular, and there are fears of escalation. Nuclear war, anyone? Moreover, Europe is deeply dependent on Russian gas, and imposing a strenuous economic blockade, notably cutting the gas, will hurt European economies.
So, Putin's dominant option is to defect, which gives him the most payoff, as he most likely gambled correctly that Europe will complain but ultimately tolerate Russia's dominance of Ukraine.
BN: I must say I'm surprised by Russia’s war. Yes, Putin wants to poke and humiliate the U.S. and NATO and tarnish their standing if not their credibility. Yes, he views Ukraine as an inseparable piece of the Russian homeland. Yes, he wants to expand Russia's sphere of influence. But all of these arguments have been obvious for not just months but years. They're not new. What is new is Putin's willingness to pursue a large scale war in the face of potentially high costs and a unified West—things that are different from 2008 (Georgia), 2014 (Ukraine), and 2015 (Syria), when the West and the U.S. in particular was distracted (economic collapse, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, ISIS) and divided (inside Western countries and between Western countries). Moreover, Russia's prior interventions on Putin's watch (except for the Chechen Wars) were scaled down and quite limited. This use of force looks to be fairly widespread and ambitious.
The speech Putin gave earlier this week, in both tone and substance, signaled that he was going to give the go ahead for a military intervention in Ukraine. I figured Putin was going to consolidate military control over Donetsk and Luhansk. But this military effort has gone beyond that. Explosions have sprung up almost all around Ukraine, as Russia neuters Ukrainian defenses, and that could pave the way for a major ground offensive.
I see Putin's new Ukraine war as ambitious and reckless. The further Russia encroaches into Ukraine, it's entering more hostile territory and inviting a military response. In other words, the farther west Russian forces go, they're more likely to meet resistance. And, as already stated, the Europe and the U.S. are mostly united and ready to inflict severe economic damage on Russia. Has Putin downplayed these costs? Perhaps. Maybe he doubts that Ukrainians will fight for their country—an unsurprising mistake, since he doesn't see Ukraine as an independent country, let alone one worth fighting for. He probably doesn't think the West is bluffing in its pursuit to exact an economic toll on Russia, though it's conceivable that he believes that the costs won't be all that high. After all, Russia weathered just fine the Obama sanctions after the first Ukrainian fiasco in 2014.
I also wouldn't rule out a couple of other factors. First, for the past 2-3 years, Putin's approval ratings have sagged. He's seen protests on the streets in 2021. Reports indicate Russia struggled with covid. I don't doubt that Putin was looking for some rally-around-the-flag boost to bolster his government, undermine the opposition, and soothe his ego.
I also think that it's very possible Putin looks at Ukraine as part of a legacy project. The end of the USSR defanged Moscow's power, ushered in instability and chaos in Russia, and relegated Russia to the sidelines of world affairs in the 90s. Putin has sought order and stability at home and power and influence abroad, and achieved quite a bit of success, particularly relative to the Yeltsin era. He knows that scholars and analysts can look back at Putin as the leader who restored Russian pride and power by unifying the core of the U.S.S.R. (Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine). He restored the roar of the Russian bear.
Lastly, I wonder if Putin just got sick of kicking the Ukraine can down the road and wanted the situation settled once and for all, costs be damned. That might sound like an unsatisfying reason to start a war, sure. But people, even world leaders, do dumb things when they are exasperated.
YS: I don't think public opinion really matters. The last several surveys from Levada (the last trusted survey institution in Russia) showed Putin still commanded a decent approval rating of roughly 60% before he invaded Ukraine. It was not as outlandish as the 95% that autocrats often claim, but it is still a good rating. Plus, the media is totally controlled by the Kremlin and there is no significant opposition. As an autocrat, Putin could just sit back and do nothing while the fire of Covid raged around him.
There are other developments in the last few years that have played a role here, such as Ukraine's purchasing of Turkish drones that showed their effectiveness in the Armenian-Azerbaijan war and Ukraine's desire to join NATO soon. Yes, the timing of the war is surprising, because we didn't think that Putin would risk causing a general war. But I think in the past few days, Putin basically came to the conclusion that there was no good way to withdraw without losing prestige and with no gain at all.
I may wrong, but I doubt the U.S. and NATO are going to interfere except by using ineffectual economic sanctions, which have no teeth considering how much Europe is dependent on Russian gas. The main question now concerns the limits of Putin's ambition.
BN: Your last sentence begs some questions. In your view, what are Putin's ambitions? And what's the end state of the war?
YS: Most likely, a regime change in Ukraine. Putin will install a puppet government and then declare a ceasefire. At this point, simply seizing the breakaway provinces would create a very hostile regime in Kyiv that would demand to join NATO. By forcing a regime change, Putin would put a Russia-friendly regime squarely in Russia's orbit and discredit U.S.-NATO at the same time. Even now, the credibility of NATO is shot due to the lack of concrete action on the ground.
BN: During his tenure in power as president and prime minister, Putin has been brazen, certainly, but not really reckless. He's taken good care to limit economic, military, and political costs in his various nefarious activities. He's often relied on plausible deniability (especially via the use of proxy forces), even that's been far-fetched at times. This military campaign is awfully reckless. And I agree. Based on Russia's military maneuvers, it sure seems like regime change is what Putin has in mind. But to install and keep in power a puppet regime in Kiev, that means that Russia will likely be an occupying power, much like the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. And if so, we'll likely see an insurgency campaign by the Ukrainians. I don't see how Russia can get in and out easily and quickly and still achieve its goals. Because once the Russians leave, that puppet government would get toppled in short order, as the history of colonial administrations tells us. Unless, at the end of the day, Putin is fine with simply inflicting damage on Ukraine and teaching Ukraine and the West a lesson. I wonder if Putin has deluded himself into thinking that the Russians will be welcomed as saviors and brothers—much like Rumsfeld's comment about U.S. forces in Iraq at the beginning of that war—and so they won't fight back, there won't be a quagmire, and the war will be relatively cost-efficient.
YS: Russia doesn't care about human rights. Either Russia silences the journalists or simply commits mass murder to shut everyone up, so I don't see insurgency as that much of a deal for Putin. Which is unlike the U.S., where atrocities lead to protests and uncomfortable questions during White House briefings.
Two things that keep bothering me for the past few days. First, why didn't we see this coming? Are we so biased against war that despite all the intelligence, we still thought that Putin would not attack. I mean, look at the simple Prisoners' Dilemma I posed above: the best option for Putin was to defect, and yet we, or rather I, still think, in our last conversation, that Putin was bluffing and he needed a face-saving formula to back off?
Second, does this mean we are back to multipolarity? I think should the U.S. and NATO fail to take action, this suggests to other states that they should not be reliant on America’s world order. Plus, dictators and the wannabes will be even more emboldened to roll back democracy.
BN: I've believed for years that the world is multipolar—tripolar, to be exact. I started but never finished a paper on that very topic. My argument is that when we consider both power capabilities and political/economic/military influence, we quickly find that the U.S., China, and Russia are great powers of the 1st rank. Russia is the laggard of the three, to be sure, based on its declining material power. Even so, Russia has effectively carved out its own sphere of influence in Europe, possesses and wields veto power in the UN, has power projection capabilities, and deftly acts to influence, set, and impact the global agenda. Russia is a clear great power. Only analysts and scholars with their heads in the sand—and there are many of them—choose to ignore this reality. American unipolarity and U.S./Chinese bipolarity have dominated IR storylines for years now, but Russia's resurgence since 2007 is also a very notable process worthy of more attention and contemplation. Like Obama toward the end of his presidency, who called Russia a declining power, most analysts and scholars are quite dismissive of Russia's power and role in the world, believing that the sun has already set on Russia.
We didn't see a major invasion coming because we viewed the crisis through the lens of deterrence when the spiral model is what more accurately explains the situation. Just think about it. Russia mobilized its forces, encircling Ukraine, in an attempt to induce concessions from the U.S. The West, led by the U.S., began building an anti-Russia coalition, sending more forces into Eastern Europe, and ramping up its threats to punish Russia. This didn't deter Putin but only escalated the conflict, as he grew more frustrated and insecure. Putin, sensing a growing threat from the West, sent more troops to the border, engaged in military exercises in Belarus, and declared Donetsk and Luhansk independent republics. The U.S., in turn, rebuffed more talks with Russia, wanting to avoid rewarding a belligerent Russia with more diplomacy. Unintentionally, that only escalated the situation even further. Putin, seeing that the U.S. wasn't interested in talks and wasn't going to make his desired concessions, likely felt he had little option other than pressing ahead. But at that point, pressing ahead meant crossing the brink. And that's what he did.