Making Sense of the Israel-Iran War
Brad Nelson: What is your take on the Israel-Iran conflict?
Yohanes Sulaiman: My take is as follows:
1. Netanyahu no longer believed that Trump would keep supporting him, especially after Trump received a lavish welcome from the rulers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
2. Prior to the start of this round of conflict between Israel and Iran, Trump probably would have thrown Netanyahu under the bus. Trump would have mostly likely treated Netanyahu like Zelensky, in that he would have forced Netanyahu to make concessions. The problem for Netanyahu, in that case, is that would have destroyed his cabinet and he could have gone straight to jail.
3. Netanyahu’s solution: Hit Iran.
BN: Israel has hit Iran largely because it could. Last summer's skirmish showed that Israel could hit Iran almost with impunity. In order for missiles to breach Israel's defense systems, Iran has to launch many of them at roughly the same time. But even then, only a fraction sneak through, and that method quickly exhausts Iran's military capabilities, to the point that a prolonged war with Israel is probably out of the question. Moreover, Hamas and Hezbollah are badly hurt from years of fighting against Israel and in no shape to get involved in the fight between Israel and Iran. Israel also can't count on Syria, now that Assad is gone and al-Sharaa is in power. At bottom, Iran is weakened and mostly alone.
And with Trump in the White House, Netanyahu knows that he can do almost anything he wants in the region and the White House would provide little to no opposition. At worst, the U.S. sits out the conflict while keeping the arms spigot on. But it's also conceivable, despite the Trump administration's insistence that it's not involved in the fight so far, that it could help knock down incoming Iranian missiles—and perhaps do more, depending on Trump’s ambitions.
The specific timing is interesting. Israel said that it was getting signals on Iran's nuclear program build-up that spooked them, and that’s probably true. And the U.S.-Iran talks, from Netanyahu's perspective, were worrisome. If the talks don't lead to a brokered deal, then that means Iran has bought itself extra time to continue to advance its nuclear program and strengthen its defense capabilities. And if the talks did produce a nuclear deal, any agreement would probably only paper over the main issue of Iran's centrifuges and its ability to enrich uranium. Netanyahu made the gamble that it's better to act now, with power trends in his country's favor, than wait until some later point when Iran has recovered a bit.
YS: He could, but the question is why now. Granted, both Hezbollah and Hamas are, for all purposes and intent, defanged. Syria is no longer a client state of Iran and does not want to be dragged into this fight. Israel could have attacked Iran a few months ago, but didn't until this week. And I argue that it is because of Trump's mixed signals that he wanted to push for a deal with or without Israel's agreement. Still, my feeling is that Netanyahu bit off more than he could chew. Iron dome is impressive for sure, but Israel hasn't been hit by a massive missile bombardment—and already some of those missiles have gotten through. It will be a while until we get a full picture, but so far, it does not look that encouraging for Israel, that it doesn't follow their plan that they could beat Iran in a quick fight.
BN: My bet is that Israel probably looked at the U.S.-Iran talks and thought that their resolution won't be in Israel's interest. Either the talks go nowhere or Trump gets antsy for a deal and sells out the Israelis just so he can get a quick political win. As I said above, either outcome isn't good for Israel. And given Israel's power advantages over Iran today, Netanyahu wasn't going to passively accept this situation.
I think Israel should be encouraged, given the progress it’s made so far in combination with the relatively feeble counterpunching from Iran. However, my assessment could change (1) the longer the war lasts and (2) should Israel sink deeper into conflict (leadership capitation, regime change, etc.).
At this point, in light of the lack of regional military resistance, one key question is: How far does Israel go in its war with Iran? How expansive are its war aims? It harbors regime change ambitions, but is it willing to act on them?
YS: Netanyahu is pushing for regime change. But when a country is under attack, its citizens, regardless how much they loathe the leadership, will rally around the flag. I believe that this in the end will actually give more breathing room to the regime. There is no way Israel can invade Iran. As NATO found out in Serbia back in the 1990s, you can't win solely on air power. You need to have boots on ground, which at this point, is impossible, with Israel's army way too overstretched to invade a country as huge as Iran.
BN: Interestingly, Reuters reports today that the Israelis recently presented a plan to Trump in which they would have assassinated Khamenei, but Trump personally vetoed it. Apparently, the U.S. isn't going to bless any Israeli plan to kill Iranian political leaders unless/until Iran harms an American. That begs a question. If Trump acquiesced to Netanyahu's proposal to target the Ayatollah and he was indeed killed by Israel, then what? Leadership decapitation isn't the same thing as regime change. Without troops on the ground and a likely groundswell of domestic support for the Islamic Republic in the event of a decapitation strike, we'd simply see a rearranging of the deck chairs in the top leadership but nothing more than that. In that case, eliminating Khamenei would be more symbolic than meaningful to the war.
YS: Frankly, Netanyahu at this point is simply throwing stuff at the wall and hoping that it works somehow. I will be very surprised if the Israelis have any end game at all, aside from hoping that either the clerics will surrender or the Iranians will overthrow their leadership. As George H.W. Bush found out, however, despite the fact that the U.S. decimated the Iraqi military during the Gulf War, Saddam could still easily dispatch his opposition, including massacring the Kurds. And in Iran, we don't have a personalistic dictatorship but a religious-based oligarchy, which might will make the regime more resilient.
As I noted, I think this is a strike out of desperation, that Netanyahu is afraid that Trump was going to bypass him and throw him under the bus in order to get Iran to sign a nuclear deal. This is akin to all the brouhaha during the first Trump administration, when Trump wanted to make deals with Kim Jong Un. Everyone, rightfully, freaked out, afraid of how big of a concession Trump would have given North Korea at the expense of South Korea and Japan. Just look at what happened to Ukraine.
BN: How do you see the war playing out over the short-term (days and weeks ahead)? Does Iran continue to fight? Or does it press for talks in order to stop attacks and save the regime?
YS: Based on some reporting, it seems that Iran really wants a way out from this conflict. A problem is that I doubt Netanyahu will want to stop unless Iran gives an unconditional surrender, which Iran won't do. Considering that Hamas, even with its reduced strength, still exists and still controls Gaza, Netanyahu needs a definite win. But I doubt that Iran will give him that pleasure.
Come to think about it, I am sure that those mullahs in Tehran are now cursing Hamas, especially Sinwar, for causing this mess in the first place. This is what they call "the tail that is wagging the dog."
BN: According to reports, Trump may dispatch U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Vice President J.D. Vance to meet with Iranian negotiators to restart talks. We'll see if that happens. Certainly, Iran has strong incentives to come to the negotiating table, given the level of destruction it is likely to suffer as a result of continued war and the possible knock-on domestic effects. And a possible solution seems fairly easy to figure out: Iran gets access to nuclear power, the facilities are managed by 3rd parties, and the spent fuel is stored abroad. But Iran has resisted this deal for years, insisting on the right to produce and manage its own indigenous program. The U.S. (along with Israel) needs to present a plan that helps the clerics in Iran save face. An issue is time, however. Over the last two days or so Trump has ratcheted up the rhetoric, stating that he’s running out of patience. If Iran doesn’t move fast to reach out to the U.S., it might be too late.
YS: The problem is that this is Saddam Hussein's dilemma in 2003. He kept implying that he had WMD and Bush, including most neocons, believed it. The U.S. kept telling Saddam to open up for inspections, and Saddam kept refusing because he feared that once everyone knew that his cupboard was bare, the regime would be seen as vulnerable. The Kurds and the Shiites would have rebelled. Perhaps Iran would have struck.
Similar to Iran today: This would completely undermine the loyalty and trust from Iran's clients, hurt the regime's reputation domestically and internationally, cause the regime to be viewed as vulnerable, and it may fall. It is simply impossible for the regime to give up the nuclear program. Too much is at stake.
BN: I don't see this as the same as Hussein's example. Outsiders and observers thought he had WMD when he didn't, and so, as you point out, he had an incentive to bluff and conceal. Here, in the case of Iran, no one is accusing Iran of actually possessing a nuclear weapon. So opening up the nuclear facilities won't pose the same regional dilemma for the clerics as it did for Saddam. There are domestic risks, sure. The public could see Tehran's decision to voluntarily let its sovereignty get violated—which is what would happen if the Ayatollah lets 3rd parties manage and control the nuclear process inside of Iran—as a major sign of political weakness. That could rile up the masses. On the other hand, continued war could lead to the deaths of most, if not all, of Iran's ruling class, including Khamenei, in the not too distant future. If Trump thinks Iran isn't interested in reviving talks and is going to fight to the end, I could see him let Israel try to engage in leadership decapitation. The safest option, the one best geared toward self-preservation for the clerics, in the end, is engaging in meaningful negotiations ASAP that effectively end Tehran's control over its nuclear facilities.
YS: My point is that Iran has always been seen as close to going nuclear. It just needs a small push to cross the red line, and that's where the deterrence lies: The uncertainty of whether Iran is going to cross the red line, which makes the United States, EU, and Israel nervous and unwilling to push Tehran too hard. By letting inspectors come, inspect, and perhaps get rid of the enriched uranium, Iran loses the uncertainty that makes this kind of deterrence so effective.
If you think about it, there are actually two kind of deterrence: the absolute one, that you are certainly sure that the other will do whatever they will do, and the uncertain one, as illustrated by this clip from the always excellent “Yes, Prime Minister”:
Anyhow, it is funny that now Trump is trying to lead the parade by demanding Iran's unconditional surrender. Talk about the tail (Netanyahu) wagging the dog (Trump)!
BN: I'm glad you mentioned Trump. Because that's where I'd like to end this discussion. In light of Trump's posts on social media in recent days (unconditional surrender, "we" have control over Iranian air space, the Ayatollah is an easy target, etc.) and reports that Trump is warming up to the idea of the U.S. striking Iran, much of the Israel-Iran war talk in America has focused on speculating what the White House might do in the coming days. Will Trump decide to throw U.S. muscle into the fray by attacking Fordow (and other sites)? What do you think?
YS: It really depends on whether Trump thinks Netanyahu is close to victory or not. He wants to be seen either as a great deal-maker, or a decisive great leader. So if Israel seems to be flagging, he will push for a deal, but if Israel is able to give the impression that they are winning and just need a little push, he will jump in the fray to claim credit.
This, however, is very problematic, since people—including agencies—often miscalculate, and I doubt that Iran will just roll over and surrender. As much as I loathe the theocratic government, it is the only game in town. If any replacement leader or movement—such the Crown Prince of Iran, Reza Pahlavi—doesn’t obtain support from the military, we will see the country either disintegrate into another Iraq, or the Mullahs-IRGC will strike back with vengeance.
BN: Trump has been increasingly schizophrenic on the war, taking all sorts of positions, becoming more hawkish over the few days. Is this intentional? Is he putting his madman theory into practice here? Perhaps he's staking out extreme positions on the war—one day emphasizing talks that are aimed at a final settlement between all parties, another day hinting that the U.S. is on the precipice of helping Iran eliminate all of Iran's nuclear capabilities, if not more than that—to keep the Ayatollah off balance and fearing the worst. Or has Trump been talked into contemplating a more hardline position by MAGA necons and especially Netanyahu? The New York Times thinks it's the latter. But I'm not so sure. Trump does have a history of taking multiple positions on issues, being unpredictable and opaque, especially on foreign matters.
I do think you’re on to something in your take on Trump wanting to throw U.S. forces into mix to bandwagon on the success of Israel and claim credit for any successes on the battlefield. The first day or two of the war, when it wasn’t clear how Israel would fare, Trump was hesitant and talked more about negotiations with Iran. Now that reports indicate that Israel has inflicted damage on Iran’s nuclear facilities and suffered low costs in the process, Trump has changed his tune, such that he’s openly, publicly discussing the possibility of America joining Israel in war. I would hope that is not the overriding factor for Trump, though.