Making Sense of AUKUS
Over the last week, my colleague Yohanes Sulaiman and I discussed via email the recent Australia-United Kingdom-United States strategic pact (AUKUS). This three-way alliance is designed to develop and share advanced technology, build a class of nuclear-powered submarines to boost Australian defenses, and work together on Indo-Pacific security matters, among other things. The implications of this new alliance are far-ranging—for the three AUKUS nations as well as for regional security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. Below is our conversation.
Brad Nelson: My first question is a pretty basic one. Is the new U.S.-U.K.-Australia pact strategically meaningful for the Indo-Pacific?
Yohanes Sulaiman: It is strategically meaningful in the sense that this is a formal pact, unlike the Quad, which is basically a dialogue, with no clear goal or formal commitments. While there are a lot of discussions about the Quad, a problem is that it is not a formal binding pact. AUKUS is a formal pact, providing a central hub for security/economic collaboration to occur. It formalizes America’s commitment to defend Australia's interest in facing China's aggressive posture. And it creates an infrastructure for more collaboration to happen. Perhaps more importantly, it forces regional states to pick sides: either you are with the pact or against it. So, it is strategically meaningful.
From Southeast Asia’s perspective, most nations there don't want to choose sides. They fear China, but at the same time, they benefit from economic cooperation with China. And they also are concerned with America’s growing regional aggressiveness, because that will inevitably force states to pick sides. So, it is strategically meaningful but at the same time, it will likely produce a lot of headaches for states in the region.
BN: The heart of the new AUKUS pact—and the part that's received much attention—enhances Australia's submarine capabilities, helping Australia to move from diesel-electric to nuclear-powered submarines. Do you think this is a significant upgrade? Is it enough to put China on notice and impact Chinese movements in the region?
YS: Of course, strategically, it is an ungrade and it is problematic for China, as it is very difficult to detect nuclear-powered subs. This means that Australian submarines could suddenly appear in South China Sea undetected, and that's a big problem for China.
As long as China pursues an aggressive policy in the South China Sea, this will cause major problems in the future. AUKUS shows that the U.S. is increasingly serious about dealing with the threat from China. And unlike the Quad, this is a more formalized pact that fully commits the U.S. to the defense of Australia and the region. Additionally, this will provide the defense architecture for India and Japan to commit, should things get worse with China. This is essentially the beginning of containment. In the short run, AUKUS does not damage China at all. China can still expand its power and influence over other small states. But the pact signals that the states now have the option to go against China.
BN: I do think what's lost in the discussions about AUKUS is the time lag. Australia won't receive the full-fleet of eight nuclear-power subs until the 2040s. Apparently, it's possible, though not certain, that Australia could lease some subs from the U.S. as a stopgap measure until its fleet hits the waters years from now. But still, Australia is not getting a big upgrade now, and might not for decades. So it's not as if AUKUS is tipping the regional balance of power right now. And frankly, by the time the fruits of AUKUS take full effect, Chinese military power will likely be far beyond what it is today. I've seen estimates that China could build 8-10 of its own class of nuclear-powered subs in the next 10 years; China already has about a dozen of such subs.
There are two prominent effects of AUKUS, at least to me. First, as you suggest, it's a clear and firm signal that the U.S. is committed to containing China. This is something that's real and here to stay. It's not just a Trump thing, and it's not just a rhetorical device by Washington elites and think tankers. Second, China will respond accordingly, and as a result, we will get to see the security dilemma come to life in the Indo-Pacific. AUKUS will feed into China's feeling besieged and encircled. And that will push China into upping its military modernization program, in order to neutralize AUKUS, break the anti-China regional coalition, and stymie any other moves by the U.S. along the way.
The other interesting bit here is the timing. AUKUS was announced just after Biden held a lengthy conversation with Xi. It sure seems like Biden didn't like what he heard from Xi, and probably surmised that Xi is probably going to be difficult to deal with and is uninterested in being a cooperative partner with the U.S. I don't know if the talk played any role in his decision to go ahead with AUKUS—that process was probably long in the making. I do think it made Biden feel better about AUKUS.
YS: The time lag is not so important. It always takes years, and the Aussies will get most of their subs long before 2040s. Furthermore, there are other strategically consquential parts of AUKUS. What is important, as you noted, is the commitment from the U.S. to help Australia.
BN: Let's turn to the one aspect of AUKUS that's probably generated the most attention so far: France's reaction. What do you make of France's response to AUKUS (criticism of the U.S., U.K. and Australia, pulling Ambassadors, etc.)?
YS: Pulling out ambassadors is an overreaction, though France's anger is understandable. It was caught off guard with AUKUS, its submarine deal was cancelled, and it was treated as less important than the British in the Indo-Pacific region, even though both are European powers. Not to mention, Macron is facing an election, and the last thing he needs is his opponents painting him as weak/irrelevant in global affairs. That said, I do believe that the damage won't last. France knows that they need the U.S. more than the U.S. needs the French. Already, Biden and Macron have played nice, and the French ambassador will return to Washington. Mending fences with Australia will be more difficult because of the cancelled submarine deal, but in the end, France will swallow its pride and patch up its differences with the Aussies.
BN: Those are good points. I've also heard that the French are particularly ticked that England is part of the deal. The French have called Britain a "third wheel" in AUKUS, and not important enough for Paris to recall its ambassador. Paris sees England as getting an unfair reward for withdrawing from the EU. France also sees AUKUS as evidence that post-Brexit Britain intends to move beyond and away from Europe, pursuing its own independent approach to foreign affairs. But I'm not sure what the French expected. England was obviously going to go its own way after leaving the EU, at least to an extent, and that by definition meant less time, attention, and space for relations with the continent. Plus, it was very likely that Brexit, as England watchers know, was going to lead to even closer U.S.-England relations.
After all, while the entire Brexit mess unfolded on Trump's watch, he repeatedly broached the idea of doling out sweeteners to Downing Street, such as trade deal and other perks for England, so as to soften the blow of EU withdrawal and to signal support for breaking away. Additionally, it's no secret that Team Trump saw Brexit as an opportunity for the U.S. to reaffirm and pursue closer ties with London, and at the time, it seemed like Boris Johnson was very receptive to these plans. Perhaps Macron didn't anticipate Biden embracing a Trump-like deal that pulls England out of Europe, so to speak. But if so, then that's a failure on his part. Had he been paying attention (or reading our work, for instance!), he'd have realized the continuities between Trump's America First program and Biden's own America First foreign policy.
YS: In the long run, though, the big question is whether France (and the EU) is willing to sacrifice its economic interest (trade with China) in order to take a stand against China in the South China Sea/Pacific Islands. Are the French willing to do so at the expense of straining relations with China?
BN: France will fall in line with the U.S. eventually. If France—or any other European nation that would prefer to play nice with both the U.S. and China—doesn't fall in line, or doesn't do so in a timely manner, then it will effectively break NATO. And France doesn't want that, as much as Macron laments that NATO is "brain dead." And playing nice with both sides indefinitely, even as Sino-U.S. hostilities ratchet up, does France no good. China will never be France's ally and is only interested in making a buck off Paris and French citizens. And irritating the U.S. during a cold war with China carries security risks. French options are constrained as a result of being a second tier great power. French history and ego may pull it temporarily toward a more independent approach to the emerging cold war. But in the end, it's not strong enough to stand on its own and it has no choice but to bite its tongue and side with the U.S. That said, if China continues to alienate a growing number of countries worldwide—and Europe increasingly has its own problems with Beijing—Paris might not be a reluctant partner in an anti-China coalition; it could be an active and willing ally.
BN: I'm curious to hear the view from Southeast Asia. You're there. What are you hearing? And specifically, what does Jakarta think about AUKUS?
YS: Hanoi is probably secretly happy, as this pact could yield more support to its position. But if it is at the expense of regional stability and economic gains, Vietnam may not be that happy. And the same goes for Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. Still, it really boils down to how China responds. If China keeps behaving belligerently, then it will undermine the security of the South China Sea claimants, forcing them to build at least an understanding with the three AUKUS parties. I think Indonesia does realize that the pact is not about Indonesia, but it does affect Southeast Asia, which Indonesia considers as its backyard/sphere of influence. And going forward, the policies and actions of the major powers there, including the AUKUS three, will likely undermine Indonesia's leadership in the region—something that runs counter to Indonesia’s national interest.
BN: I do wonder if, as the emerging U.S.-Sino cold war comes to its backyard and the U.S. focuses more on the Indo-Pacific, whether Indonesia sees itself and ASEAN becoming constrained in its options—that the big players are throwing their weight around the region and Jakarta (and others in Southeast Asia) are increasingly forced to react to them rather than pursuing policies/strategies that they want to pursue. If so, what are the implications of that?
YS: The answer is that ASEAN will have to make a choice and no member state likes it, especially Indonesia, which thinks that any great power in its backyard is a sign of trouble.
BN: One last question. Any thoughts on how Biden finalized and rolled out AUKUS? In particular, should have Biden kept France in the loop, as Paris thinks it should have been? (Of course, Australia basically argues to the contrary, that France should have known that the Aussies didn't like the sub deal with Paris and were long looking to get out of it.)
YS: The U.S., U.K., and Australia probably think that France would complain either way, unless they get involved/get a piece of the cake. Rather than having the French preempt the announcement, they'd rather deal with the aftermath. It is a “damned if they do and damned if they don't” moment. Besides, FRAUKUS sounds weird!
BN: Perhaps, but I think Biden deserves quite a bit of blame here. He's made diplomacy—especially repairing relations with U.S. democratic allies in Europe—the centerpiece of his foreign policy. He's said it on the campaign trail. He's said it in office. He just delivered an entire speech on it this past week at the United Nations. In his words, the U.S. is “opening a new era of relentless diplomacy.” And yet, in this case, he violated the essence of his foreign policy. He kept France out of the loop, riled up Macron, and provoked fears that Biden is just Trump minus the crazy Twitter content. All of which was totally unnecessary. Sure, France would've been ticked either way, given that AUKUS effectively nullifies the Oz-France submarine deal. But clear and open communication with the Macron administration would have muffled French outrage and prevented the situation from becoming a mini-crisis.
I also think there are serious questions about how the Biden administration executes foreign policy. It does so rather sloppily, and this is despite Team Biden's claim that they are experienced professionals who'd restore normalcy and organization to the policy process. The execution flaws are becoming a worrisome pattern now. There were mistakes made during the brief Israeli-Palestinian skirmish, the Afghanistan exit, and now AUKUS. Biden and his team has got to get a handle on this. The array of unforced errors is hurting Biden's poll numbers, and creating doubts internationally about his claim that "America is back."
YS: If you put it that way, that's true. Biden's appeal is that he is not Trump—that in a Biden presidency, it will be business as usual, much like the days before Trump. So yeah, the fact that Biden has made these unforced errors is problematic.