Game of Thrones in Russia
Over the weekend, my colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman and I briefly discussed and assessed the recent coup attempt by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and his forces. Below is a lightly edited version of that conversation.
Brad Nelson: What do you make of Prigozhin’s march from Ukraine to within a few hundred kilometers of Moscow? What does it mean for Putin?
Yohanes Sulaiman: First, Putin’s grip on power is weakening. The fact that a mercenary unit—granted, it is Wagner, which is a competent military outfit—could take over Rostov unopposed and march almost unopposed until they reached 200 km from Moscow was proof that nobody is that interested in defending the regime. I mean, had this happened in other countries, let say in the U.S., and the mutineers marched unopposed nearly all the way to D.C., I would strongly question the loyalty and competency of the American military. Putin, however, is lucky that people think Prigozhin is far worse than him, such that everyone prefers to stick with the devil they know. Moreover, Prigozhin offered no alternative that set him apart from Putin. In fact, it seems that under him, the war would have intensified, and that, I think, is one of the main reasons why Prigozhin failed to gain support.
So Putin won by default, but it seems that he is barely hanging on. He is still in power because there is no credible, acceptable alternative.
And of course, the fact that Lukashenko was the one doing so-called negotiating is actually a blow to Putin’s prestige. Putin is the leader of a great power, and yet he relies on his much weaker neighboring state, a vassal, to negotiate? That shows that Putin distrusts his subordinate so much that he suspects them to defect or that nobody in Russia is competent enough to negotiate with Prigozhin.
BN: I largely agree with you. It would seem like Putin needs to hug the security state even tighter these days, because he needs them in Ukraine and for his self-defense back at home. Perhaps we’ll see more perks coming their way? It also seems like Prigozhin agreed to a bad deal. Yes, he gets to flee to Belarus and the criminal charges reportedly will be dropped, though Wagner forces are now going to be under the auspices of the Defense Ministry. As a result, Prigozhin doesn't have a group that’s formally loyal to him anymore. If this arrangement is something Prigozhin agreed to, then he's defanged himself. If this is something Putin forced on Prigozhin, then Putin has effectively boxed in and neutered him.
The fact that the Russian military didn’t join Prigozhin and his forces as they made their way up to Moscow likely spooked him and caused him to look for a way out of the situation. At first blush, it seems strange that Prigozhin believed the military would side with him over Putin, given the litany of criticisms he’s leveled at the Russian military and the Ministry of Defense leaders over the last several months. But perhaps Prigozhin thought that the verbal attacks were made on behalf of the military—particularly the lower level grunts—rather than at the military.
YS: Prigozhin lost his nerve. Yes, he thought he would get more support from people who believed the war was handled badly.
BN: What do you think Prigozhin was after in staging act of defiance? Because that’s unclear. Some say he was after Putin’s job, others say he sought the removal of a few of the higher-ups in the military. Is it possible that Prigozhin was just looking for an exit (from the war, from his job), given the likely constant threats on his life from the Kremlin and its allies in response to his steady stream of criticism and vitriol (he’s criticized the military for its poor performance, he’s also harshly railed against Putin for launching the invasion)? And so he used his forces as a bargaining tool to make a deal with Putin and get what he might perceive as a safe departure? What say you?
YS: While I agree that this is in part a palace dispute between Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense (Shoigu et al), and he feels threatened by the integration of Wagner forces into the Russian army, I don't buy the argument that he is just trying to force Putin's hands or he has a very limited aim: his survival. This is just way too high of an escalation. If his main goal is simply to get rid of people in the MOD, he could have launched a limited mutiny in Ukraine (e.g. withdrawing Wagner to several military bases and staying put once there). Instead, on Saturday, he invaded Russia and took over an important military city and moved his troops to Moscow while downing several planes in the meantime. It was a direct challenge to the leadership of Putin. It basically shows that the Tsar is naked. Worse, that could also mean that he has some clout over the military and he was essentially a direct competitor to the Tsar.
Therefore, my only take is that Prigozhin did want to launch a coup, but he failed because he didn't get as much support as he expected.
BN: Almost all analysts, scholars, and journalists are saying that Prigozhin's short-lived, aborted coup has weakened Putin, showing cracks in the state and apathetic support at best for him. How weakened is Putin now? Is the clock ticking on his tenure?
YS: Putin is wounded and weakened for sure. The problem is that there is simply no one that is willing to pull the trigger. Putin has eliminated the opposition from the opposite end of the spectrum (moderates, liberal) who are in general not inclined to launch a military coup anyway. This leaves either the spiness slavish nationalists or crazies like Prigozhin, who are completely unappealing to the rest of society. This is one of the reasons why nobody is looking forward to the end of the Putinist regime.
BN: I do think this Prigozhin incident has shown that Putin isn't as nearly as strong as most believed. On the other hand, I also think that many Western commenters are overstating Putin's weakness. They're viewing the situation through the prism of Western political norms. I also suspect, as Max Abrahms has pointed out on his Twitter, that there's a bit of cheerleading going on here. In other words, popular commenters like Anne Applebaum are totally anti-Putin, want him gone, and are prone to viewing the slightest move against Putin as a sign that his days are numbered. But put into perspective, I don't think Putin's leadership is as shaky as many now think. He avoided open warfare, Priogozhin is seemingly out of the picture, the military is still behind Putin, Putin remains in power, and the whole situation lasted a matter of hours. It's awfully difficult to dislodge a dictator, as political science and history tell us. It's going to take much more than a half-hearted attempt by some maniac to get rid of Putin. If anything, I expect Putin to use this situation to shore up his rule by pulling out all the dirty tricks used by despots to ward off internal threats, entrench his power, and put the fear of God in anyone even thinking about challenging his leadership. Of course, that makes me wonder if any added attention and resources to his and his government's self-preservation will impact the war in Ukraine. Already, Ukraine is claiming that they've made some gains on the ground while Putin's been distracted and out of the limelight. But is that just PR from the Zelensky administration? And if not, if the gains are real, that doesn't mean this progress is necessarily sustainable.
YS: This is why the entire Prigozhin's coup/mutiny/whatever is so mind-boggling. As you noted, dictators put the fear of God in anyone ever thinking about challenging their leadership. And here we have a maniac that took over a strategically important city, marched his troops to 200 km from Moscow, while shooting down several planes/helicopters, and he ended up forgiven and exiled with his troops unmolested? That's one of the worst signals you could ever give if you want to put the fear of God in anyone thinking about challenging his presidency. Yes, he could deal with Prigozhin later, but the optics are just terrible.
At the same time, yes, by exiling Prigozhin, Putin totally discredited Prigozhin and removed the latter from being a credible threat to his power. I agree that he is not that weak, simply because there is no credible alternative to himself in Russian politics. You cannot dethrone a dictator unless you can rally behind a figure that is acceptable to at least the people who can make the difference, like the military. Well, there have been several recent leaderless movements: the Arab Spring of 2011 and the feminist protests in Iran. But the track record of them deposing dictators is not that good.