Assessing the State of the War in Ukraine
Below is a conversation I had with my colleague Yohanes Sulaiman on various recent political, diplomatic, military, and strategic developments in the war in Ukraine. At the end of our discussion, we speculate about how and when the war might end.
Brad Nelson: Let's start our discussion by assessing the military state of the Ukraine War. One major headline these days, particularly in the West, is Ukraine's comeback or resurgence in the war over the last month or so. What do you make of Ukraine's ability to push forward throughout the east, recapture lost lands, including in Kherson and Donetsk (places that have been annexed by Russia), and knock the Russians back a bit?
Yohanes Sulaiman: Two things are in play here. First, Ukraine really did well reinventing its armed forces. Similar to Russia, it started with a heavily corrupt military, one that was poorly led and trained. Then it reformed itself, while Russia stayed corrupt. Perhaps here we see the real life example of Kenneth Waltz’s principle of emulation: a vulnerable country has to act rationally, follow the best practices, and improve itself and strengthen itself because there is no fallback plan. On the other hand, countries like Russia, which feels confident and secure due to its nuclear missiles and its perceived reputation as the world’s second strongest military power, does not have that much incentive to reform itself. Plus, over the last 25 years, Russia has been fighting weak and disorganized states. It hasn't really faced any disciplined, well organized enemies. And this allows bad and corrupt leaders to rise in power, leading poorly led and trained demoralized troops.
One may argue that in the past 20 years, the U.S. has also faced weak enemies, and yet America’s military performance remains optimal. I think the difference here is in how they deal with rules of engagement. The United States has fought with one hand tied behind its back. Despite violations here and there, it has mostly obeyed rules of engagement, minimizing civilians' casualties, etc. It has tried to play the role of good guy, and as a result, it really has to keep on the top of its game. It has to maintain its military discipline, no cutting corners, no trying to find the easy way out.
Unlike the U.S., Russia simply ignores all rules of warfare, public opinion, international commentary—it just bombs its enemies to kingdom come. It disregards civilian deaths and conducts scorched earth campaigns. It collaborates with corrupt governments to terrorize civilians using the Wagner group. While its military campaigns have been mostly successful, it ends up with a poorly disciplined military which doesn't know how to conduct wars smartly. And we can see the evidence in Ukraine: attacking civilians, committing human rights abuses, going scorched earth. Not surprisingly, the undisciplined, poorly-led Russians simply collapsed when they faced professionally trained and disciplined Ukrainian units. Yes, Ukraine does pay heavily in blood due to Russia's brutality and sheer numbers, but it conducts its war smartly unlike Russia.
BN: You make good points. To what you argued, which I largely agree with, I'd add a few observations. First, it's clear that Ukrainians fighting on the ground want to fight and win the war more than Russians on the ground do. And that test of wills, which Ukraine is winning by far, is proving to be one of the decisive factors in the war. It bodes well for Ukraine that native Ukrainians are flocking back home to fight while Russians are doing everything they can to avoid being sent to Ukraine, including emigration and suicide. I suspect most analysts, scholars, and commentators, if polled at the beginning of the conflict, would've said that will and resolve is nice, and it could prolong the war and forestall for a while the inevitable outcome, but ultimately won't matter much because Russia is so much stronger militarily. But Russia, apparently, isn't that much stronger than Ukraine right now, and so will does indeed matter a great deal.
But that then begs a question: Why isn't Russia significantly stronger than Ukraine? The answer to this question is a function of both Ukrainian and Russian military capabilities and performance.
Because the West is arming Ukraine to the teeth, the playing field has been leveled. The balance of forces has evened out a bit. Ukraine wants more and more sophisticated weapons and defense systems from the West, and it's getting them. As long as Ukraine has shown that it's very competent on the battlefield, the West is giving (some nations begrudgingly so) better and better arms, though it is still withholding longer range missiles for fear of provoking Russia even further. It also matters that Ukraine is getting intelligence from the U.S., which has certainly helped Ukraine to degrade the Russian military (thinning it out on the battlefield, causing low morale, defections, etc.).
It's also evident that Russia's military was vastly overrated, which is something to which you suggested above. It's global military standing was in part a relic of the cold war, a function of its large nuclear arsenal, and, as you point out, the fact that it recently "won" minor military skirmishes against weak opponents (terror groups in Syria, Georgia) or opponents who didn't put up much of a fight (the capture of Crimea). Plus, it has outsourced some of its military operations to shadowy groups like Wagner. All of which means that Russia's ability to fight a conventional war with its military really hasn't been strongly tested in decades and its military isn't nearly as experienced as many Russia/war watchers have believed. When push came to shove on the battlefield, Russia proved to be a paper tiger, lots of growl and loud noises, but fairly little bite—at least when matched against expectations at the beginning of the war—against an increasingly well-armed, well-organized Ukrainian army.
YS: I agree with you. Morale and the willingness to fight, bolstered by Western military aid and Russia's involuntary military aid, have equalized the field. Of course, some commentators think that Russia hasn't even begun to fight, but I digress. You hit with your best units and weaponry to bring the war to a quick close and to scare your potential enemies, not sending your A-team in the fourth quarter when the enemy already is many touchdowns ahead. There are arguments that Russia can still mobilize a lot of people involuntarily and with that many meat shields, victory may follow.
Perhaps, though I just don't see any good path to victory for Russia as long as both the U.S. and the EU remain committed to Ukraine. And at this point, Russia has to be worried not only because they could lose in Ukraine, but they could also lose their empire to China. Kyrgyzstan already cancelled a planned military exercise with Russia. Putin got a snub from the Kazakhs. Armenians are ticked because Russia didn't help it. Georgians despise Russia and would gleefully love the idea of a collapsing Russia. Azerbaijan already broke away from Russia's orbit. China and probably Turkey and Iran, though all three of them currently have their own internal problems, are the beneficiaries of this new arrangement. Russia is becoming less and less of a great power and perhaps it will become a new vassal for China.
BN: I'm glad you ended your comment where you did, because I'd like to hear your take on Russia's external support. Do you think that China and Iran, specifically, will continue to back Russia? Will they remain steadfast in support of Putin if the war drags on and/or if Russia resorts to even dirtier war tactics? Moreover, do Chinese and Iranian internal problems, which you have alluded to, risk weakening their commitments to Russia?
YS: In the case of Iran, I suspect it will continue backing Russia. There are a lot of overlapping interests between those two countries (e.g., keeping the US out of the Middle East and maintaining the al-Asaad regime in Syria). Not surprisingly, Iran has been helping Russia by selling drones and even sending drone trainers to Ukraine.
China, on the other hand, is worried. It is far more integrated into the global economy compared to Iran or Russia. The war has caused a global economic crisis with the world going into a recession, and that hurts China's economy. Moreover, both the U.S. and EU are engaging in rapid decoupling from Beijing, as they no longer see China as a benign international actor. I suspect China, at the beginning of the war, had expected a quick Russian victory, and they surely must be surprised that the Russian military is so incompetent and that war continues to today. And with Russia, its partner and buddy, indiscriminately attacking civilians and generating international condemnation, China is vulnerable to receiving criticism for not reining in Moscow. While China may gain a major increase in influence in Central Asia, and perhaps it will gain another vassal in the form of a weakened Russia, I doubt that China will find this a welcomed outcome from the conflict. A weakened Russia will not help it in pressuring the EU. Worse, there is a very high possibility that Russia will become a second North Korea, and that will be a nightmare scenario. It is enough for China to subsidize and clean up Kim Jong Un's problems. Xi Jinping does not want another big baby in the form of Putin.
BN: I've been thinking about the strategic implications of the war, and your take on China and Iran seems consistent with my thoughts. As you know, much has been made about the Russia-China-Iran axis and its ability to challenge and undermine the West. And of course, in the U.S., this debate has been politicized, with partisans blaming presidents of the other political party for bringing the three nations together. The war has already weakened Russia, strengthened the cohesion of the West, and repaired some of the lost credibility of the U.S., among other things. But over a longer-term, the anti-US, anti-West tripartite axis looks like a major loser as a result of the war. Because Russia is weaker, the coalition will be weaker. Additionally, I expect the tripartite partnership to fray a bit. And after the war, I suspect that the coalition won't be nearly as ambitious as it was pre-war. And none of this takes into consideration the internal problems and stresses that Iran and China are facing these days—problems and stresses that serve to weaken and distract China and Iran and leave both states more prone to be impatient with the other two members of the axis. All of this should leave the West in a good spot, as long as it avoids being directly dragged into the Ukraine conflict.
YS: I am not sure that there really is a coalition. While both China and Iran work with Russia, it is more of an alliance of convenience, than a true coalition in an axis sense. China's support to Russia is an opportunistic one, as it seeks to split the U.S. from the EU. I suspect, originally, China expected the EU to be the dovish one due to their reliance on Russian gas and oil, and this disagreement between the U.S. and the EU over aiding Ukraine would weaken NATO.
Iran wants Russia's assistance in keeping the U.S. at bay, otherwise America can continue to check Iran's moves all over the Middle East. At the same time, I don't see Iran trusting Russia that much. Should the U.S. leave the scene, I think Iran would try to kick Russia out, either through closer relationship with China or the EU. The last thing it wants is for Russia to flex its muscle in the Middle East and challenge Iran's interest in the region. Similarly, Iran is friendly with China because China is the least threatening power out of three due to its lack of power projection in the Middle East.
Other than that, I think the Ukraine War forces China to rethink its calculations over the ease of its military to take over Taiwan. Had Ukraine folded easily, I think there would be a significantly elevated likelihood that China’s military would attempt to invade Taiwan in the near-term. But the fact that Ukraine has given Russia a hard time, combined with the full support it’s received from the West, most likely forces China to recalculate the odds of it being able to prevent the intervention of the EU, the U.S., and its allies in a Taiwan conflict. In the case of Iran, I doubt it will change any of its calculations, except that it probably will lose access to Ukraine's defense industries, which will hurt Iran in the long-run.
BN: Let's move on to the one big issue that we haven't touched on yet, and that's Russia's seemingly ominous nuclear threats. I'm interested in hearing your take on this issue. There's lots of chatter among academics these days on this issue. Many of them are worried that all combatants in the war—and yes, that does include the U.S. and the rest of NATO—are on an escalatory path and that eventually a stalemated, desperate Putin, with no other viable options left to "win" the war and save his personal and political hide, will resort to using tactical nukes in Ukraine. Is this overheated hyperbole from scholars? Or is this something that really could play out in the future? How do you see it?
YS: Frankly, a nuclear war is not in Russia's interest. I think, to some degree, liberals and constructivists are right when they argue that there is some sort of nuclear taboo going on, an international norm against using nuclear weapons. While the loud Russian clattering class keeps pushing for Russia to use tactical nukes, it is much easier for those outside of power to demand stupid things. For those in power, the backlash will be too great to ponder. Russia would be totally isolated. NATO will have an excuse to directly intervene in Ukraine. Moscow would face a massive public relations nightmare. Countries that still try to maintain good relations with Russia would have to make a choice—do they want to be associated with THAT kind of leadership? Furthermore, all those oligarchs and leaders, including Putin, have villas and children and business interests outside Russia, and they would all face seizures of their assets and deportations back to Russia. These people would rather serve a new master or perhaps make a compromise with the next possible leader. By getting rid of Putin, they will have a second lease in life, including a rapprochement with the West, and I think Putin is well aware of that fact.
Another precedent is the usual favorite dead horse: Hitler. Germany did not use chemical weapons at all on the battlefield. Aside from the fact that the use of chemical weapons might backfire due to the wind, there was a possibility that the other side might retaliate. And these are things Russia has to consider today. To quote General Turgidson, even if they are “ignorant peons,” I am pretty sure that they are not willingly going to an irradiated area. Yes, they were dumb enough to dig trenches in Chernobyl, but not when they see a mushroom cloud being detonated in the area.
BN: Yes, it's extremely dangerous for Putin—both politically and personally—to use tactical nukes in Ukraine (or anywhere else in Europe). Using nuclear weapons carries enormous risks for Russia and Putin. NATO would likely get directly involved at that point, as you suggested. An angry and motivated Ukraine, heavily backed by NATO and possibly other nations now utterly disgusted by the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, could conceivably be emboldened enough to push the goalposts forward, seeking to recapture all the territory it lost to Russia. That would be a decisive defeat for Russia. Russian elites and Putin's inner circle, seeing Russia as humiliated and brandished a pariah state (would the UN seek to remove Russia from the UNSC?), might well turn on Putin and blame him for Russia's plight.
Putin would then be at grave risk of losing power. Should Putin be deposed, new dilemmas emerge: What do they do with Putin? Let him live in his dacha? Ban him from politics? Imprison him? Or worse—does he go the way of Saddam? Furthermore, what happens to Russia's regions? Do they remain a part of Russia, or do some opt to go their own way? After all, Russia's political, social, and geographic stability and cohesion has been a constant concern of Moscow, and justifiably so given Russia's restless and irritable south and far east regions.
In short, it's easy to see how a series of cascading events following the use of nukes in Ukraine could irreparably harm Russia and Putin himself. Of course, each step along the way carries its own probability and the final end point of Putin out of power and Russia broken into pieces isn't likely to happen, though it certainly could occur. Putin is smart enough to realize this.
Moreover, I've never been a supporter of the "sleepwalking" into war/conflict/violence arguments, which is what the path dependent escalatory hypotheses are really suggesting about Russia and Putin—that Putin is unblinkingly ramping up the violence bit by bit, not backing down, willing to absorb all costs to save the war. But states and groups and leaders that use violence know what they're doing and aren't just mindlessly, unconsciously engaging in aggression. They are rational actors who make at least rudimentary cost-benefit assessments and do at least a cursory job of anticipating consequences. Putin is a rational actor; even Biden admitted as much in a recent interview. And as a rational actor, Putin knows that the costs of a tactical nuclear strike outweigh any benefits Russia or he might achieve.
In the end, I take Putin's threats as tough talk, but mostly a bluff. Many are interpreting Putin's threats as him saying that he's willing to blow Ukraine to bits. I mean, I suppose that's possible. That said, it wouldn't surprise me if his threats are his way of communicating that he's looking for a way to save face and he hasn't found one and doesn't see one on the horizon.
YS: Instead of the "sleepwalking" argument, perhaps a much better argument is the "sunk cost" and "gambler" fallacy. Putin has thrown everything except the kitchen sink at the war, and he may think that by escalating a bit further (gambling) he might pull things off. Of course, as we both agree, it will end up depending on how his supporters respond to Putin’s moves. Perhaps a feeler from Washington to someone in Putin's inner circle saying that all is forgiven if they get rid of Putin could pull the plug on the war.
BN: Yes! Models like prospect theory are a much better way to understand Putin's decision making, though it's not something that's widely discussed—at least to my knowledge—in the context of Putin and the Ukraine War. It's entirely possible that Putin, operating from a domain of losses reference point, is gambling, as you said, that further investments in the war will reverse Russia's performance on the battlefield and revive his political standing. Of course, most gamblers make bad bets and the "house" usually wins out in the end. What I especially like about prospect theory is that it gives us a plausible explanation for seemingly irrational outcomes committed by rational actors—which describes Putin's continued investment and escalation—risk acceptance behaviors—despite the grim situation on the ground.
YS: And this brings us to an interesting end question: What is the most likely outcome? Will the EU/U.S. blink first due to higher cost of energy and political instability (e.g., strikes in France)? I am less concerned about the political situation in the U.S. It seems to me that the GOP will not sabotage Biden's effort to help Ukraine regardless of all the nonsense spewed by right wing hacks. And with Iran helping Russia, there shouldn’t be much appetite for the GOP to assist Russia.
On the other hand, will we see a situation where Russian troops finally say enough and riot, which in 1917 led to the fall of the Tsar? Or will Putin escalate the situation first by using nukes/dirty bombs, or whether someone in Kremlin is finally smart enough to pull the trigger or put something in Putin's tea?
BN: I don't know how it's going to end. There are too many variables at work in this case. I do anticipate this war continuing for quite a bit longer. Neither side is close to being ready to call it quits or make concessions. Ukraine is emboldened by recent battlefield successes and wants to recapture more of its territory in the east and south. Russia is embarrassed, and as we've already mentioned, thinks that it can reverse its recent war losses and still win in the end. Putin isn't going to roll over and let Ukraine take back the east or Crimea without a very dogged, bloody fight. Moreover, Washington is in a pro-war mood right now. The Biden administration will not pressure Zelensky to seek a war exit anytime soon, not with the momentum on Ukraine’s side, and the now infamous 30 progressives who called for stepping up US diplomacy with Russia with the aim of getting a cease-fire were browbeaten into retracting their proposal. Perhaps U.S. policy changes when/if the GOP takes the House and Senate this November—Republican leaders have already signaled that Ukraine won't get a blank check with them in charge of Congress.
I suspect that Ukraine and Russia are politically and militarily content with a rough stalemate for a while—Ukraine and Russia making minor advances here and there, but not much really changing on the ground. I just don't know what will be the factor or event that pushes Putin and Zelensky to the negotiating table to end the hostilities. Unfortunately, the war could end up as another of the world's frozen conflicts.
YS: Perhaps I am too optimistic when I said that Ukraine might be able to kick Russia out from the occupied territory. But in any case, I hypothesize that there will be a new North Korea in the form of Russia, and that Ukraine will probably build a new DMZ along all or a part of its border with Russia for self-defense. There is no longer any trust between Kyiv and Moscow right now, of course, and it will take generations for that to change.