Below is a conversation I had this week with my colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman. U.S. President Joe Biden has now passed the six month mark in his presidency. As such, he’s been in office just long enough to build a nascent empirical record that we can discuss and analyze. That’s exactly what Dr. Sulaiman and I do below. As you will see, we also compare and contrast Biden with his predecessor, and arrive at, I believe, some surprising observations.
Brad Nelson: Biden has been in office a little over six months. I think it’s time for a quick assessment. How would you evaluate his foreign policies?
Yohanes Sulaiman: After four years of hectic foreign policy under Donald Trump, Biden has brought a much sedated one to the White House. Biden spent the first six months reassuring allies, rebuilding ties to Europe, and talking to Putin. And the first foreign policy crisis under Biden—the Israeli-Palestinian dispute—has already withered away. Biden seems to not pay that much attention to Asia, besides China.
BN: I somewhat agree with your assessment. Biden has started his presidency by course correcting U.S. foreign policy. That has led him to focus on issues he believes Trump ignored or dismissed: American allies, international institutions, the pandemic, climate change, and the like. I do think Asia has gotten attention from Team Biden. For instance, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has visited South Korea and Japan and India, and met with Chinese officials in Alaska. Right now, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin is on a trip to Asia, with planned visits to Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. And Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman is back from a recent visit to China, Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia, and has traveled to parts of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, in late May. And both Biden and Blinken have held virtual meetings with members of “the Quad.” In all, that's a very good start.
Even so, U.S. foreign policy under Biden probably has tilted a bit toward Europe, though that’s understandable. The Trump years caused a significant rupture in transatlantic ties. If the Biden really wants the U.S. to lead again globally, as he says he does, then he has to find countries willing to follow. If Biden can’t even get America’s closest friends and allies in Europe on board, then his project of “American leadership” is effectively stillborn. With that in mind, spending considerable time and effort reassuring Europe makes sense.
Both Biden and Blinken have crisscrossed Europe already. Tellingly, Biden's first overseas trip was to participate in G7 and NATO meetings. And as far as I can tell, his next planned foreign trip is to Europe again, for G20 and UN climate meetings later this fall. Of course, all of this begs a question: Is American leadership a desirable or feasible goal for the Biden administration? Already, there’s been some discussion on that very topic.
YS: Austin's trip is way overdue. Leaders of Southeast Asia believe the U.S. doesn’t give the region the attention that it deserves. Blinken messed up badly (a computer snafu) in his first dialogue with ASEAN leaders, while China has visited the region many times in person. Yes, the U.S. will be the partner of choice for most Southeast Asian countries, mostly due to China's stance in the South China Sea, but this region deserves more attention from the U.S.
Beyond that, there are four elephants in the room that are all linked with Trump. First, U.S. immigration policy regarding Central America. It seems to me that despite the rhetoric of dismantling the wall, based on what Vice President Kamala Harris said during his visit to Central America, it seems that Biden is essentially following Trump's border policy. But with Trump no longer in power, Central American leaders are probably not taking that stance seriously. So could we see more caravans coming to the north?
Second is Cuba. Biden seems to be trapped between a rock and a hard place—the progressive Democrats that demand the end of sanctions on Cuba and the Cuban voters in Florida. As a result, Biden and his staff make interesting comments and speeches, but they don’t really do anything on the issue. On the other hand, is there anything that Biden can do?
Third: Putin. With the rise of ransomware and the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations, there's no big red reset button. But Biden seems to engage more—and I think ironically—than Trump (e.g. approving the gas pipeline to Germany, jump starting arms talks, Biden’s meeting with Putin). Do you think that's a fair assessment?
Last, but not least: Afghanistan. It will likely take the Taliban about six months to complete its takeover. What is the future of the country? What does the Taliban do once in power? Do we see an about-face, in which the Taliban decides to play nice to receive aid and political recognition, or does the group continue to make trouble (for Afghanistan and the world), govern according to medieval principles, and remain a pariah?
BN: It sure looks like Biden views Asia almost solely through the prism of East Asian issues (China's rise, worries about Taiwan, North Korean nukes, the need to reassure U.S. democratic allies Japan and South Korea, etc.). Southeast Asia is an afterthought and South Asia is a place to get out and avoid. Overall, that's exactly how Trump approached Asia. So I agree, that's a concern. In fact, I think that's one of the underreported themes of the first six months of the Biden presidency: the surprising foreign policy consistency from Trump to Biden. Undoubtedly, things like democracy, allies, and institutions are major issues that have been prioritized by Biden, and each were shunned and demonized at times by Trump. But once we get past those issues and look elsewhere, like at U.S. relations with much of the world, there is considerable overlap between Trump and Biden (e.g. China, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Central America, and so on).
Biden has a bit more freedom to engage with Putin because he doesn't have the stink of Russiagate (whether real or not) on him. He can make moves without worrying about whether Congress or the public thinks he has ulterior motives. Still, like the previous four years, Congress is more hawkish on Russia than the president. That's going to limit the chances of a thaw in the relationship. Nevertheless, Biden's apparent blessing of Nord 2 might help, especially if Putin sees it as a concession.
It does seem like Biden is doing as much fighting on foreign policy with the left wing of the Democratic Party than he is with the GOP. He has to find a way to tamp that down—whether that means keeping the fighting behind closed doors or convincing the progressives to bite their tongues. The longer that goes on, the more he'll look like a besieged president taking on fire from all corners of the U.S., which will hurt him over the long-run.
Afghanistan isn't going to be fun. Biden made the right choice to get out. But the security and political situations will continue to go haywire in the country. And that could mean political trouble for Biden. The media is going to make hay out of the likely next steps in the country (more violence, Taliban control, imperiled rights for women), and comparisons to Saigon in '75 will be routine. And the GOP will opportunistically and hypocritically flail Biden, even though it was fully on board with Trump's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. It seems like Biden wants to formulate a containment plan for Afghanistan, so as to prevent spillover effects. That’s a logical plan. But in order for that plan to work, it will require significant regional buy-in. Is that feasible?
It's way too early to say what Afghanistan will look like by the end of Biden's tenure. Do neighboring states decide to work—either individually or collectively—to stabilize the country? What does the Taliban do? Do Afghan security/police forces put up much of a fight as the Taliban likely gobbles up more turf? Can Kabul and the Taliban politically coexist, or do both sides view politics as a zero-sum game? We shall see.
YS: Most of the GOP will support the decision to withdraw, though the party will balk at it should the situation deteriorate quickly. Really, it is a no-win situation. It is a costly and very unpopular war, and there is no good exit strategy that basically won't hand the entire country to the Taliban. I think the Taliban realize this, and the war will start once the U.S. leaves Afghanistan. I won't be surprised if the movement splinters and we will have more chaos and civil war even after Taliban takes power, since based on how they acted in the 1990s, they are very incompetent at leading and governing. And while China apparently has made agreements with Taliban, I am not sure about the relationship over the long-term, as they have vastly different values and interests. Similarly, while Pakistan is the benefactor of the Taliban, it is questionable how strong Islamabad’s influence will be. And keep in mind that India will not stay silent either. So, in the end, Afghanistan will continue to be a headache for the region.
BN: Let’s jump to the Middle East. As you know, the U.S. has wanted to more fully focus on Asia, China specifically, for almost 15 years now, but it keeps getting sucked back into the Middle East. Yes, Obama had his "Pivot to Asia" and Trump had his "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," but both got bogged down at various times in the Middle East because of various regional events (Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, and so on), and as a result, neither president really made much headway in transitioning the U.S. to a more Asia-centric foreign policy. Do you think this pattern, which has played out during the Obama and Trump years, will once again emerge during the Biden presidency? Already, Team Biden has spent time on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, discussing the mission of U.S. troops in Iraq, and restarting the Iran talks. And after the events of the last few weeks, the Tunisia coup is now on the White House radar.
YS: Yes, I agree that the Middle East will garner a huge share of attention from Biden—especially given the region’s future, which includes more disorder and violence. And Iran looms large in Biden’s foreign policy, since we know he wants to get the nuclear deal back on track.
BN: The prospect of more disorder and violence in the Middle East is possible—in part because of the multitude of regional problems, and in part because of America's minor shift toward retrenchment there. The Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon corridor—the so-called Shia crescent—has been problematic since the revolution in 1979, and has only become more knotty and troublesome since the war in 2003. I expect that area to continue to plague the U.S. during the Biden years, since the main sources of instability, tension, and violence haven't been addressed at all.
I’m glad you mentioned Iran. Expectations were high that Biden would quickly rejoin the Iran deal, yet that hasn't happened. It's good to see that Biden isn't looking to cooperate with Iran just to cooperate, and the Iranians now know that. Iran is going to have to bend some to get all of the Trump sanctions removed. Can Biden’s team work the diplomatic process to produce results (e.g., changes in Iranian behavior, revisions/extensions to the JCPOA, etc.)? Otherwise, the restarted talks (with Iran and members of the P5+1) are nice but mostly cosmetic changes in U.S. foreign policy (compared to the Trump years).
YS: So how do you evaluate Biden's six months in power?
BN: So far, so good. I'm encouraged, actually. U.S. foreign policy hasn't been as ideological as I feared, given Biden's frequent hyping of the global democracy-authoritarian fault line. For now at least, it looks like U.S. foreign policy is more ideological in rhetoric than in practice. Additionally, there haven't been any major, major international crises or unforced errors by Team Biden. Overall, Biden's not completely revamping U.S. foreign policy. He's addressing the weaknesses and failures of his predecessor while keeping the sensible parts of Trump foreign policy. He's brought more organization and professionalism to the foreign policy process (no more foreign policy by tweet; Team Biden is experienced, sane, and sober). He's made U.S. foreign policy a bit kinder and compassionate (vaccine distribution). He's significantly changed the tone coming out of the White House. And reassuring jittery allies (regardless of their regime type) is an excellent course correction, for a number of national security reasons. While I'm not sure that "America is back," as Biden likes to say, its foreign policy does rest on a better foundation today than before January 20th of this year.
YS: It seems to me that Trump has quite a huge influence on U.S. foreign policy. Unlike during the Bush or Obama years, the U.S. no longer keeps harping democracy and human rights. It is more subdued, as it focuses mostly inward. We see far fewer foreign visits by the president. In Obama's first six months, he visited Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Clinton visited Asia and Europe in his first six months, and Bush, while focused on Europe, made four trips. Biden, in contrast, took only one visit to Europe in his first six months. Not sure whether it was by temperament or simply because there are just too many things to do in the U.S., especially during Covid times. But my impression is that the U.S. seems to be more domestic oriented nowadays, and that's probably due to Trump.
BN: Undoubtedly, Trump created a new status quo on a number of foreign policy issues. Change from the status quo those issues will produce more or less (domestic and international) costs for Biden. On some issues, the costs are relatively high; on others, the costs are minor. But that's the way it is for every presidential administration. And so, with that in mind, it's no surprise that Biden has maintained a host of Trump policies for now.
Additionally, as I mentioned already, a part of Biden's foreign policy is also motivated by correcting the weaknesses and excesses and oversights of the Trump era. That's why Biden has so strongly highlighted the importance of democracy, international institutions, alliances, and human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Now, I do think there's been less of an effort to lecture and browbeat foreign actors on these issues, as there probably was during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama years, though that could be due to the personality and political style of Biden and his team, rather than other variables (such as the “Trump factor”).
Attending to U.S. domestic issues is a political necessity for Biden. And he can thank Trump for that, which is what I think you’re getting at. The bundle of pressing issues he faces today (the pandemic, socio-political strife, economic inequality, and rising crime are facts of life) were all triggered or exacerbated on Trump’s watch. If Biden has any desire to get reelected, if he wants to steal a senate seat or two in '22, or just not lose Congress to the GOP, he must deal with these issues. His job performance, in the end, will ride more on how he handles these domestic issues than any foreign policy.
But I wouldn't overhype Trump's influence, however. Global structural imperatives are an important factor here. As China continues to grow and act assertively in its backyard, and as the Washington establishment increasingly views China as not just a competitor and rival but a geopolitical threat, the White House (regardless of who sits in it) is becoming locked into more hardline positions on China. Engagement with China is out. Containment, deterrence, and economic de-coupling are the new guiding principles. And in this emerging new cold war with Beijing, the U.S. is going to have to be delicate in how it broaches human rights and democratization and other internal meddling in foreign countries. It makes no sense to turn off and alienate nations, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific, that could be valuable partners in combating China's power and influence. This is standard foreign policy in the context of great power competition.
Nice analysis, but I have not seen any policy direction on African, whether Biden is also mentaining the policy of Trump towards African .