Assad Is Out, HTS In
In between grading and the holidays, my colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman and I have squeezed in some time to talk about the ongoing seismic political changes in Syria. Below is that conversation. For the sake of clarity and conciseness, parts of the discussion have been lightly edited.
Brad Nelson: Assad is gone. Despite almost now 14 years of varying levels of conflict and violence and what looked like Assad's increasingly entrenched position in Syria since 2015, roughly about a week's worth of events quickly drove him from power. Given what happened and where Syria is right now, what stands out to you?
Yohanes Sulaiman: As usual, the big question is the aftermath. It seems to me that Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa (or Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, as he’s widely known) has been striking the right chord so far. Regardless of his background, he presents himself as a very moderate guy with "youthful mistakes." Granted, not everyone's youthful mistake is in joining al-Qaeda, but his approach so far appears to be working: admit past mistakes, be straightforward and earnest, show that you are tolerant, and let the media run with it.
Of course, we don't know and won't know what al-Jolani will do in six months or a year from now, but based on what is happening now, I doubt Syria will end up like Afghanistan. First, keep in mind that while he won the civil war, he hasn't conquered the entirety of Syria. The Kurds remain formidable and it is doubtful that he will try to pick a fight with the Kurds. And, second, I think al-Jolani is smart enough to understand that an ISIS 2.0 is not acceptable, and he saw how ISIS in the end got clobbered badly since they alienated everyone. So the safest option to stay in power is to be a moderate, embrace everyone, and get a lot of aid and assistance from Europe, which really wants to send the Syrians who migrated there back home.
BN: My immediate take centered on the Syrian military: What happened to it? Why did Syrian forces melt away so quickly? Why not stay and fight against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)? I was surprised the military didn't put up a fight and allowed HTS to walk right into Damascus. Days before HTS entered the capital the then-Syrian Interior Minister Mohammed al-Rahmoun said there was a “very strong security cordon on the outskirts of Damascus and no one can break it.” Obviously, that was nonsense.
In the end, some in the military switched sides, defecting to the rebels, as they didn't see Assad winning without support from Russia and Iran. Others in the military just didn’t see the fight as worth it, given the low pay and lack of many perks of service. What did they get from a decade plus of war? Assad didn't value them, so why fight for him? In the days before everything unfolded, Assad promised to boost salaries by 50%, but that was too late. The widespread apathy and discontentedness in the military had already set in and was irreversible.
There was another issue here at play: Assad’s military in 2024 wasn't the same as it was at the beginning of the war in 2011. Thousands of deaths and casualties have thinned its ranks. Replacements were conscripts who didn't want to be in the military and they didn’t want to fight or get hurt. Moreover, the top brass wasn't interested in fighting wars but in making money. The Syrian military has been a major node for drug trafficking and smuggling.
Now, while there has been plenty of cheerleading in the media and on social media about the "end of the civil war," it's way too soon to think that Syria is out of the woods. The Arab Spring—particularly the cases of Egypt and Tunisia—should provide experts and observers with plenty of reasons to be cautious about the next steps after the ouster of a long-ruling autocrat.
First, will internal struggles persist? Will the rebels remain united? Will the end of the war simply expose existing fissures in Syrian society? Already, the Kurds have taken advantage of the situation by expanding into Deir ez Zor, which has angered the Arab population, who have threatened a war, if necessary, to boot them out.
It is also possible that Assad’s ouster will give way to new political fault lines in Syria. For instance, over the weekend, al-Jolani said that drafting a new constitution could take three years and new elections might not happen for four years. Given the significant logistical, administrative, and political burdens that need to be addressed, those timeframes make sense. But will Syrian citizens see it that way? Will they get impatient with the new unelected leaders in power and push for faster change? And if they do, how does this manifest itself? Furthermore, as political decisions are made on a wide array of issues (the substance of the constitution, the shape of the political system, the definition of citizenship, the role of religion in the state, and so much more) in the coming days and weeks and years ahead, winners and losers will naturally emerge. How do the losers cope with all or parts of a political system they don’t like? And just as importantly, how does al-Jolani deal with new pockets of opposition that are bound to surface in the coming days?
Second, neighboring countries are still using Syria as a playground—now, they're trying to consolidate gains with Assad out of the way and HTS not fully in control yet. Turkey is making further in-roads into Kurdish controlled areas in Syria. Israel has moved into the safe zone just outside of the Golan Heights and has launched over 100 strikes against Syrian military equipment and chemical weapons depots. And that's just the tip of the iceberg. Will Iran just give up Syria, its major client state? What does HTS do about Russia's and America's military presence in Syria? And do those two countries seek to remain in Syria, or do they decide to leave in the near-term?
Third, I have plenty of questions about HTS. Has HTS really beyond its al-Qaeda past, its roots? Is it the moderate, welcoming entity it says it is today? Now that it is in a position of power, will HTS seek revenge on the Alawites and other perceived political enemies? What kind of political system will HTS attempt to set up? Can HTS govern Syria? By controlling parts of Idlib for the last several years, HTS does possess some administrative experience. Still, the state is so weak that HTS is going to have to engage in a major effort at state building. Will HTS actually govern Syria, or will a new political entity, under a broader political banner, be created in order to rule Syria in a unified way? Is HTS, or whatever group that runs the Syrian state, willing to invest in all of these labor and resource-intensive tasks? The easy way out—the path that so many authoritarians have traveled—is to forget about state building, governance, and administration and instead use the state as its piggy bank, live a life of luxury (as Assad did), and let the people fend for themselves.
BN: At this point, who do you see as emerging as the winners/losers from the rise of HTS and the departure of Assad in Syria?
YS: Regionally, both Turkey and Israel are clear winners. Both countries benefited greatly from the fall of Assad, notably because of the collapse of Iran's influence. The European Union could also fare well, if it plays its cards correctly. The EU will benefit from the end of the Syrian refugee problem and the rise of a friendly democratic country in the Middle East. If both al-Jolani and the HTS moderate themselves enough—and so far all the signs are encouraging—the European Union and the United States will be in a good position to take advantage of the situation.
The losers are the usual suspects: Iran, its proxies (Hezbollah and Hamas), and Russia. Iran's Shia Crescent is gone and Russia lost its key military bases that it used to supply its African corps. Yes, Moscow is planning to move its assets to Libya, but that will take time and money to do so, and the Russians lost billions of investments in Syria. Not something that Putin can just shrug away. And whatever overtures Russia will make to the new Syrian regime, the Syrian population is rightfully pissed off against Russia (its support of Assad, double-tap bombings, indiscriminate killings, etc.). I really doubt that Russia will be allowed to maintain its military bases in Syria.
BN: That's a good list of winners/losers. I’d add a little more to your discussion about the U.S. Assad's departure is right in line with America's interests. The U.S. has wanted Assad out for over a decade now, going back to the Obama days. Additionally, the U.S. has wanted to roll back Iran's influence in Syria. And in one short 11-day window, the rise of HTS accomplished both things for America. After all, it's unlikely that HTS is going to have rosy relations with Iran, given that Tehran and its proxies have been trying to kill al-Jolani and his group for years now. The good part is that U.S. diplomats have already met with al-Jolani in Damascus, and the talks seem to have gone well. The U.S. lifted its bounty on al-Jolani, and received promises from al-Jolani on protecting women's rights and preventing Syrian turf from becoming a playground for terrorists.
Relatedly, we know the Sunni powers have wanted Iran out and a Sunni-friendly government in Damascus, and they now have a great opportunity to capitalize on events. I have to think that the Sunni powers will try to fill the gap vacated by Iran and further shift the regional BOP away from Iran and toward their favor, which puts them on a winner's track.
Lastly, with Russia, Iran, and Assad either out of the picture or on their way out of Syria, the onus heavily falls on HTS to deal with ISIS and AQ. At this point, terror groups and cells in Syria are at a minimum a short-term winner. The U.S. has conducted dozens of airstrikes on ISIS positions in areas formerly controlled by Assad/Russia since HTS took the reins in Damascus. Interestingly, CENTCOM recently revealed that there are 2000—not 900—U.S. troops in Syria. Clearly, the Pentagon still sees counterrorism in Syria a major priority, and likely an even bigger one now that a fragile new government is in power.
Biden's imminent exit from the White House raises questions. Will Trump think it necessary to keep troops in Syria to fight ISIS and AQ? After all, he didn't in his first term. Trump was begged by the military to reverse his position to remove the troops stationed there, which he eventually did. If Trump maintains Biden’s policy in Syria, does the U.S. coordinate with HTS on anti-terror strikes, or not? It was one thing for the U.S. to do what it wanted in Syria when Assad was in power, but it's another when there's potentially a friendly government in charge.