Around the World: The Kim-Putin Summit, Nagorno-Karabakh, and War in the Middle East
Over the last two weeks, Dr. Brad Nelson and his colleague Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman have discussed a wide range of current world events via email. The below conversation has been edited slightly for length and clarity considerations.
Brad Nelson: What do you make of Kim Jong Un's visit to Russia to meet with Putin? Is it a big deal, or not? What do you see as the major implications of the Kim-Putin meeting?
Yohanes Sulaiman: Probably not much of a big deal except to formalize what we knew about the Russia-North Korea relationship: that North Korea has been selling weapons to Russia and, alongside China, Russia has been helping North Korea in evading sanctions.
At the same time, Russia is basically giving a signal to Washington that it may be willing to increase tension in the Korean Peninsula as long as Washington keeps interfering in Ukraine. But frankly, I doubt that it matters that much. As desperate as Putin is, he would not want to risk a full blown conflict with Washington. Kim also is not an idiot. He only keeps doing the missile tests/provocations to pressure the U.S. to give concessions, which by this time, such provocations are no longer working. He does not want to risk a general war in the Korean Peninsula, which basically will mean the collapse of his regime. And similarly, China does not want any conflict next door, as it will force China's hands, forcing it to do things that it does not want, which is completely destroying its relationship with South Korea and Japan.
BN: As you know, speculation is that Kim and Putin discussed a deal in which North Korea would transfer ammunition and arms to Russia, presumably for its war in Ukraine, in exchange for various items desired by NK (food, fuel, satellite technology). Would beefed up North Korean military support for Russia significantly impact the war? What do you think?
YS: The problem with getting North Korean arms is that it is similar to raiding your military museums: Most of their weaponry are either obsolete or duds. So while they will help the Russians with their current ammunition shortage and thus stabilize the frontline, they won't help Russia win the war or force Kiev to the diplomatic table. Kim will be the one who benefits massively from the deals: More foreign currencies, food, fuel, and more importantly, this signifies a de-facto end to the U.S.-led embargo over North Korea. Russia has already been heavily sanctioned by the U.S. anyway so there won't be much that the U.S. can do to punish Russia for breaking sanctions.
BN: I suspect the biggest impact of the Kim-Putin meeting is a symbolic one. Specifically, it's the growing bipolarization of world politics into two competing and resisting blocs consisting of the West versus a rogues gallery of states. The primary rogues include Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, but countries like Cuba, Venezuela, Libya, Syria, among others, are also members. This probably was inevitable as the world shifts from unipolarity to bipolarity. The emergence of China as a second superpower and prime competitor to the U.S. was just naturally going to split the world into competing blocs, as each power seeks allies and partners to defend and advance its interests in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. And while many might prefer to remain neutral or non-aligned, a good portion of them will get sucked into the vortex of an increasingly intense and hostile great power competition. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine is what really sped up this bipolarization. The war has stimulated alliance cohesion among NATO members in particular—at least for now. But it's also driven Russia and China closer together and forced Russia to search for more partners and strengthen its existing relationships. Add in the fact that many in the so-called Global South don't blame Russia for the war, instead seeing it as a NATO-provoked conflict, and that quite a few have connections to the Wagner Group, Russia's (and its friends by extension) pool of partners is growing and its overall strategic position isn't nearly as poor as Western commentators believe.
YS: Of course, the biggest question is whether this new bipolarity is sustainable in the long run. Unlike during the Cold War, Russia no longer calls the shots, as it is now relegated to the position of China's junior partner. And I doubt China really wants to support Russia all the way to the end of the rabbit hole, since in the long run, that does not give China any benefit aside from a very weakened Russia, akin to a second North Korea that Beijing needs to take care of. Plus while the Global South doesn't necessarily blame Russia, they also don't want to cut ties with the US—except the Wagner influenced states, which were failed states anyway.
BN: You make a good point in questioning the sustainability of bipolarity. In addition to what you wrote, there is the issue of whether we're hit "Peak China," given China's current economic troubles and its mounting economic problems going forward (especially its significantly shrinking population). Scholars like Michael Beckley worry that Peak China could mean a hyper-aggressive China that looks to consolidate gains before it declines. What we may be entering is a period of "unbalanced bipolarity," in which there are two superpowers, yes, but the U.S. is much more powerful than China. Already, scholars are revising their estimates about when China's economy will overtake America's, with some doubting China will ever do so. And while China has made great strides over the last three decades in improving and modernizing its military capabilities, it's still way behind the U.S. military. The still spends three as much on defense as China, the U.S. has a clear technological lead, and the US can project its military power around the world at the speed of light—something China cannot do. Frankly, the prospect of unbalanced bipolarity interesting area of research that should be explored, since so much of the existing literature on bipolarity assumes that the two lead world powers are roughly equal in military and economic capabilities. I suspect the coming era won't look like that, and as a result, the systemic consequences won't look the same as they did during the cold war period.
BN: The next topic I’d like to cover is one that people might have missed. Nagorno-Karabakh, the independent ethnic Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, essentially exists in name only, the result of force and coercion by Azerbaijan. The separatist government there will officially close up shop in 2024, paving the way for Azerbaijan to fully absorb the territory. But the hard part of emptying the region of Armenians is already underway—really it has been underway since late last year, when the Azerbaijanis blocked off a major corridor, preventing food and energy and medicine from getting into Nagorno-Karabakh. Is the withering away of Nagorno-Karabakh a product of Russian distraction and not having the bandwidth to deal with another regional crisis and the Azerbaijanis taking advantage of that? Or is there something else going on?
YS: As much as I want to chalk this up to Russia's perfidy, it is clear that in this case, Russia is distracted and it cannot afford to have another conflict, and this time, with the involvement of both Turkey and Iran, two countries that still give support to Russia. So basically, Russia sacrifices Armenia, which it doesn't care about anyway. If I were the Armenians and any other client state of Russia, I would be very worried about Russia's security guarantees in the future. As long as relations with the West deteriorate, Russia will have no choice but to give free rein to Iran, Turkey, and to some degree Azerbaijan to do whatever they want in Central Asia/Caucasus. It has no means or ability to retaliate. Putin will seethe, but this actually signals Russia's descent to second rate power, even lower than Turkey or Iran in Central Asia.
BN: The fact that Russia has sacrificed Armenia is interesting to me. It's another casualty of the war in Ukraine—it hurts Armenia, sure, but it also hurts Russia, because it weakens its ever narrowing sphere of influence, as you suggested. Of course, Armenia has been critical of Russia and recently said depending on Moscow was a "strategic mistake." Last month, the Prime Minister's wife, Anna Hakobian, personally delivered a humanitarian package to Ukraine—a symbolic clear shot at Russia after trying to stay neutral during the war. It also looks like Armenia might ratify the Rome Statute, clearing the way for it to join the ICC, which wants to arrest and try Putin at The Hague.
While the West didn't do much to help Armenia during its struggle with Azerbaijan over the last few years, I get the sense that it's feeling the situation out a bit, seeing if there's an opening. A few weeks ago, the US and Armenia held joint military (peacekeeping) exercises. Armenia now has EU border monitors and negotiators working on its behalf. And last week it was announced that "France has given its agreement to the conclusion of future contracts with Armenia which will allow the delivery of military equipment to Armenia so that it can ensure its defense." In the end, Armenia's proximity to Russia, its dependence on Russian energy supplies, and that Russia has 2000 troops in-country likely limits how far Yerevan can go. And with that in mind, Armenia is probably just voicing its anger at Russia and diversifying its foreign options just a touch (it's also reaching out to Iran and India), rather than breaking completely out of its shell and siding with the West. Nevertheless, it's something to watch going forward, given all of Russia's difficulties.
YS: I find that Armenia is growing closer to the west (e.g. joining the ICC) due to its losing the war against Azerbaijan. Had Armenia won or had Russia actually spent some resources propping up Armenia, there wouldn’t have been any attempt from Yerevan to look to the west, regardless of how liberal the government is. They have been relying on Russia for their security, but in the end Russia did not deliver. Yes, it won't completely break free from Russia, for now—especially with both Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan's growing influence in the region, which won't be countered by Moscow any time soon. But at the same time, Russia's growing weaknesses, its growing international isolation, and its inability to actually uphold peace in its own backyard is forcing Yerevan to do some soul-searching. Additionally, I believe in the future, amid the rise of Turkey and Azerbaijan, Russia will no longer be particularly relevant in Central Asia/Caucasus.
BN: I was going to end this conversation after our discussion of Nagorno-Karabakh, but this weekend’s events in the Middle East require us to work through what’s happening. So what explains the surprise bout of violence Gaza/Israel? Why did Hamas attack? And why now?
YS: Too early to say, since we are still lacking information, but there are several things going on:
1. Intelligence failure: Either Hamas is getting better in keeping secrets or Mossad screwed up really badly. I suspect this is due to distractions facing Israel. Domestically, Netanyahu's attempts to emasculate the Supreme Court leads to discontent and stretching Mossad's resources thin. And with the discontent going on, political upheaval, and the creation of the so-called National Guard by Ben-Gvir, there are just too many distractions going on.
2. Linked with the first is the fact that Hamas hasn't made any serious attempts to hurt Israel, in comparison to other groups such as Islamic Jihad, and this most likely lead to complacency within the military.
3. Iran's involvement is clear. It wants to regain initiative in the region, especially with the defeat and humiliation of Armenia, its key partner, by Azerbaijan, in addition to the fact that the deal between Israel and Saudi is imminent. Moreover, Iran is facing internal strife and needs a distraction as the theocracy has been losing its legitimacy and popularity.
4. So for Hamas, this is basically an excellent opportunity to strike. Of course, I am only saying this post-hoc, when this attack caught real experts on the Middle East off guard.
BN: My take is that the much-hyped impending rapprochement between the Saudis and Israelis played a big role here. I know some political commentators have downplayed this, saying that the attacks were so coordinated and planned-out, that the US-Saudi-Israeli diplomacy couldn't have factored into the violence. But I disagree. The diplomacy has been ongoing for quite some time—probably well over a year at this point—and so the timing issue doesn't rule out the diplomacy as a factor. And more importantly, the rapprochement means, as I'm sure Hamas/Islamic Jihad knows, that the Palestinians were going to get left out in the cold, as Israel gets a free hand to do what it wants in the West Bank and the Saudis look the other way. So Hamas/Islamic Jihad are trying to spoil the deal, figuring that the Saudis won't go ahead with the deal when there's war with Israel, especially the kind of extensive, major war Israel has been drawn into.
I do think the ongoing domestic legal and political troubles in Israel, which has distracted Netanyahu and created a window of opportunity, and the anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, which began October 6th, 1973, are important to the timing of Hamas's/IJ's decision to attack.
So, bottom line, given what I wrote above and that everyone seems to be caught off guard (I saw a quote floating around from Jake Sullivan in the last week or two saying that the Middle East is more peaceful today than at any time in the last 20 years), I do agree with you that this was a ripe time to attack, at least from Hamas's/Islamic Jihad view.
OK, so all of this begs a question: How does this play out? And what are the likely consequences of what will unfold over the coming days, weeks, and months ahead in Gaza/Israel?
YS: What is really interesting here is the aftermath of the war. There will be a lot of finger-pointing, and I am sure that Netanyahu and his ilk will use this as a way to further tighten their grip on power, curbing the power of the Supreme Court, and to escape all the criminal scandals haunting him.
On the other hand, I am pretty sure that the end game will be the same. Hamas gets more hostages that they will release later in exchange of freedom for militants, and nobody is going to hold Iran responsible: Basically, we’re back to the status quo.
There is no way Israel is going to launch a full military operation that will completely destroy Hamas and its infrastructure in Gaza. It will be politically untenable for many other Arab countries regardless of whether they support Hamas. The more interesting question is what Israel itself will be. Will this mean that the right will dominate the next elections and thus destroy any semblance of secularism/liberalism/rule of law left in Israel? Will this actually be seen as the right being culpable for the massive intelligence failures that led to this fiasco?
BN: Hmm, I disagree. After all, this attack is now widely being called Israel's 9/11. The severity of the attack—which so far includes missile attacks, on-the-ground infiltration of Israeli territory by Hamas/Islamic Jihad, killings of Israelis by these infiltrators, and dozens of Israelis who've been taken as hostages in Israel and are now in Gaza—and the sheer humiliation of it for Netanyahu and the military means that Israel is going to wage an extended, bloody campaign. This war for Israel will be far bloodier, longer, and more ambitious than prior rounds versus Hamas over the last 20 years. Importantly, Netanyahu will have the political freedom—from Israeli citizens and from the White House—to do what he wants in this war, and he will face extreme domestic pressure to "finish off" Hamas. Israel is now launching rockets into Gaza. It will inevitably send in ground forces. I won't be surprised if we see a reoccupation of Gaza by Israel, even if only for a temporary period. Hamas, I suspect, will have a limited presence in Gaza going forward, after the war. Its members—whatever is left of the group—will likely have to set up shop elsewhere—whether Lebanon, Qatar, Iran, or somewhere else.
Other likely consequences: I'm sure Zelensky isn't happy about these events, as Ukraine could well find it competing with Israel for American resources and attention. The three-way diplomacy between the Saudis, the U.S., and Israel is dead for the foreseeable future. The Biden administration has gotten considerable domestic blowback from the GOP for the attacks, and that will continue given we’re about to enter election season.
To me, the big questions are: Does the war involve Hezbollah (whether because the group inserts itself into the conflict or because Israel decides to go after it)? And does Israel go after Iran, Hamas's main backer? How does the war impact relations between Iran and the Saudis, which recently normalized ties?
YS: The reoccupation of Gaza will not be permanent. By the end of the day, if Israel really wants to finish Hamas as a political force, it has to finish off its position in Gaza, and most likely also to invade Lebanon, which necessitates a long and bloody war that will lead to many civilian casualties, something that everyone does not want. There will be pressure from Washington and European and Arab capitals for Israel to show restraint and to withdraw after giving Hamas a bloody nose. There will be demonstrations in Washington and European capitals, with the usual suspects declaring Israel as an apartheid state, etc. While the attack by Hamas perhaps is more deadly and provocative than prior attacks, at the end of the day, nobody wants to see the Palestinians get obliterated by Israel.
BN: I don't think Israel intends to go into Lebanon at this point, but if Hezbollah gets involved, then all bets are off. Hezbollah has launched rockets into northern Israel (and Israel has responded), but it’s unclear at this point if the group is now an active war participant, or if it’s simply signaling its support for Hamas and approval of the attacks on Israel.
For now, Israel has to get those border areas near Gaza under control, and the gun fights are ongoing. It also is defanging Hamas in Gaza through the air, reducing its defenses and thinning out the group, to the extent it can, overhead. And after that, the ground forces are going in. I've seen reports indicating the US expects ground forces to enter the war in the next day or two. From there, the issue turns to how long the Israelis will stay in Gaza, what it intends to do in Gaza, whether the war expands to the West Bank, and whether the war expands beyond the Israeli-Palestinian territories. But given that Netanyahu on multiple occasions already has told the Israeli public to be prepared for a long, difficult war, I'm going to take his word at face value and expect the war to be measured in months, not days or weeks.
As long as the White House backs Netanhyahu during the war—and so far Biden has given him a wide leash—the Israelis won't care all that much about what the international community has to say. And domestic politics in the U.S., aside from The Squad and some pockets in the American population, will largely line up behind Biden in giving Netanyahu a long leash to eliminate as much of Hamas (and possibly Hezbollah if necessary) as possible.
In this case, Israel can confidently claim it's the clear victim—Hamas started the war, Israel was attacked in a brazen way that was captured on television and social media for all to see. Some of the details already revealed, like the slaughter of 200+ at a music festival in southern Israel by Hamas and the hostage-taking of over 100 Israelis, including children and elderly, has already sparked widespread disgust in foreign capitals and that will cause them to give Israel freer rein than usual in this war. Furthermore, keep in mind that Israelis weren’t the only ones killed or are being held captive as a result of the initial attacks, citizens from 16 other countries were also killed or are now held hostage (or are missing)—including 11 Americans killed and an untold number captive/missing.
All of these atrocities will generate sympathy around the world and restrain, at least for a while, the usual loud complaints about Israeli force against Palestinian groups. Netanyahu must know this by now, and he’s going to take advantage of global support while he has it. That bodes ill for Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the coming days, weeks, and months ahead.